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REASONABLE COPYRIGHT
IRINA

D.

MANTA*

Abstract: Using the lens of the cognitive bias literature, this Article examines and critiques the "reasonable man" standard, focusing on the use of
the standard in an extremely fuzzy area of the law: copyright. In copyright, the test for infringement is whether a "reasonable observer" would
believe that two works-often involving media that do not lend themselves to precise measurement-are substantially similar. I begin by casting doubt on the usefulness of the reasonable man standard in such a setting. Are judges and juries truly able to determine what an abstract
reasonable actor would find substantially similar? What types of cognitive
biases will likely cloud this determination? And are biases likely to have a
stronger or weaker effect when infringement questions are subjected to
group deliberation as opposed to the individual decision making ofjudges? Next, I address the problems that I uncover in the copyright context
by first reviewing some potential solutions, including both a proposal to
reduce the role of juries in substantial similarity determinations and the
possibility of trial bifurcation. Ultimately, I show that an openly subjective
standard that focuses on the works' intended audience and uses social
science surveys as evidence of infringement should replace the prevalent
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"objective" reasonable observer standard. Implementing such a solution
would at least partially acknowledge that we are dealing not with perfectly
reasonable, but rather boundedly rational, actors.
The test for infringement of a copyfight is of necessity vague.
-Learned

Hand1

INTRODUCTION

He does not act irrationally. He does not kill, steal, or intentionally
inflict emotional distress, unless he has exceptional grounds for doing
so. He is never reckless or negligent. He may not quite leap tall buildings in a single bound, but he knows his place in human society and
does not step outside the bounds of legal behavior. Scholars, attorneys,
and law students spend substantial portions of their lives unmasking
who he is and what he does. He is probably the single most ubiquitous
character in American case law, but his exact nature has managed to
elude us for hundreds of years. "So may I introduce to you / The act
you've known for all these years," 2 he who goes by the reasonable man.
Across areas of the law, and especially in criminal and torts matters, the judicial system measures human behavior against the reasonableness yardstick to determine its legality.3 We expect judges to be reasonable, and to determine (for summary judgment purposes or on
appeal) what a reasonable jury would do. In other areas, such as copyright, it is the opinion of the reasonable man that interests us-an infringement case can rise or fall depending on whether he finds substantial similarity between two works.4

This reasonableness model relies on the idea that most people in
society act roughly in accordance with rationality most of the time, or at
least enough so that they do not significantly hurt others. The law holds
individuals liable when they depart from a certain range of behaviors
one would expect based on either a system of social norms or a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. 5 Two types of problems may chip away at this
framework. First, people of different social and cultural backgrounds
IPeter

Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
Sgt. Pepper'sLonely Hearts Club Band, on SGT. PEPPER'S LONELY HEARTS
CLUB BAND (Capitol Records 2002) (1967).
3 See generally Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and
Tort Law, 74 CHL-KENT L. REv. 1431 (2000) (providing a philosophical analysis of the role
of reasonableness in tort law).
4 SeeArnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
2 THE BEATLES,

5

See infra notes 38-63 and accompanying text.
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may not all agree on the limits of appropriate behavior in a number of
situations, and several scholars contend that the majoritarian, dominant group may simply get its way due to hierarchical reasons. 6 Second,
cognitive biases complicate all the layers of this model. For a variety of
reasons, as social science and behavioral law and economics have
taught us, even well-meaning individuals may not always act as ironclad
logic would dictate and may display pervasive patterns of skewed reasoning.7 Judges and juries are not immune from such biases, which
may compound the existing elusiveness of the reasonable man's nature.
Although issues of bounded rationality raise concerns in every area of the law, copyright law adds further complications when it asks jurors to evaluate whether copying of vague subject matters (such as art,
music, or literature) took place, and if so, whether the new work is so
"substantially similar" as to be unlawful. 9 This is problematic because it
requires imperfect jurors to judge imperfectly rational individuals by
making decisions that are permeated with the risk of cultural and cognitive biases at every level. To top it off, as in other types of cases, imperfect judges must determine whether a potential juror is "too biased"
to sit on a jury (during voir dire), whether a "reasonable" jury could
find the defendant liable (on a motion for summary judgment), 1° and
whether a jury's verdict went against the great weight of the evidence
(on a motion for new trial) or was entirely unreasonable (on appellate
review)." Even in the large percentage of cases that are submitted only

6 See

infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.

7A number of scholars offer foundational work in this area. See generally Christine Jolls
et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1998) (making

broad recommendations for the economic and behavioral analysis of law); Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the RationalityAssumption
firom Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1051 (2000) (discussing the ways in which decision-making trends can inform an understanding of legal behavior and advocating for lawand-behavioral science research).
8 See infra notes 64-118 and accompanying text.
9See infra notes 145-252 and accompanying text; see also Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 7,
at 1069 (defining "bounded rationality" as when actors "make suboptimal choices among
competing options given a set of preferences and use a range of heuristics-rules of thumbrather than complex cost-benefit analysis").
10 One scholar has argued that "[o]n summary judgment, the judge is effectively sitting as a juror and deciding whether he or she could find for the plaintiff." Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS
L. REv. 705, 719 (2007).
11See Cassandra Burke Robertson, JudgingJury Verdicts, 83 TUL. L. REv. 157, 164-65
(2008).
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to a judge rather than to a jury,' 2 the law's expectations of judges may
be impossibly high. Judges are asked to dispassionately delineate legal
rights despite being faced with the exact kinds of ambiguous materials
that elicit the greatest risk of distortions caused by cognitive bias. The
evidence for the proposition that judges are necessarily less biased than
juries is slim, but3 so is the evidence that jury dynamics can cure the
problems of bias.'
In this context, copyright is particularly intriguing in two respects.
The first, as mentioned, relates to the materials that copyright covers,
which are greatly subject to individual interpretation. Based on the research about decision making in the face of ambiguous questions, this
suggests that legal decisions in copyright cases will be subject to an increased degree of heuristic (biased), as opposed to systematic, reasoning.14 The second stems from the dangers inherent in the seductively
direct relationship between the judge or jurors and the alleged legal
offense. Most litigation deals with past offenses that impose a degree of
distance between legal decisionmakers and the events in question. In
most cases, judges and jurors have to listen to testimony about past
events from third parties and weigh conflicting accounts of what took
place. Copyright infringement cases are among a small percentage of
legal contests where the key question is one supposedly ascertainable
purely in the present.15 Once access to a work has been established, a
judge or jury examines songs, written materials, or pictorial representations of two works to determine substantial similarity.16 Decisionmakers
in a variety of contexts traditionally suffer from cognitive overconfidence; as this Article discusses, direct experiences with the disputed
materials are likely to exacerbate this trend.1 7 Combining these points,
the result is that copyright cases may produce outcomes that are espe12 See infra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the ratio of judge versus jury
trials in copyright cases),
13 See infra notes 64-118 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
15Another scholar has remarked on a parallel note that this fixation in time is one of
the features that distinguishes substantial similarity from the more dynamic fair use analysis. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Nornativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 53), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014395.
16 See infra notes 151-192 and accompanying text. Patent law suffers from some analogous difficulties when courts have to determine violations under the doctrine of equivalents, which declares a device to be infringing "if it performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result." Graver Tank & Mfg. v. Linde
Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280
U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
17 See infra notes 204-251 and accompanying text.
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cially biased because overconfidence will be particularly likely to minimize the degree of self-questioning by legal decisionmakers. If this is
true, it could create the perfect storm of mediocre decisions with poor
immediate corrective mechanisms.
One can already observe hints of such heightened confidence in
non-copyright cases, such as the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court case Scott v.
Harris,in which video evidence showed a car chase that concluded with
a police officer hitting the fleeing suspect's car with his own (and thereby rendering the suspect a quadriplegic).1s During oral argument, Justice Stephen Breyer explained the strength of his conviction that the
police officer was not liable, stating, "I see with my eyes that is what happened." 19 Similarly, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in the majority opinion,
"We are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself."20 Subsequent
empirical work, however, showed that the tape did not quite speak for
itself in that its interpretation depended significantly on the viewer's
own background. 21 This is a problem also likely to arise in the copyright
context.
Understanding the cognitive underpinnings of courts' analyses of
copyright infringement offers a clue as to why the related doctrines and
tests are widely considered unpredictable, 22 vague, and confusing, and
why they can result in uneven outcomes. 23 Several problems result from
this state of affairs, one of the most significant of which is the chilling
18 550 U.S. 372, 375, 378 (2007).
19Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Scott, 550 U.S. 372 (No. 05-1631).
20 Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 n.5.
21 See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REv. 837, 841
(2009).
22 See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, The Casefor "Trial by Formula,"90 TEx. L. REv. 571
(discussing outcome inequality in civil litigation).
23 See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Copyrights and Creative Copying, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TICH.J. 75, 93102 (2003) (providing examples of problematic applications of the substantial similarity doctrine); Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIs L. Rv. 719, 732 (1987) (criticizing the substantial similarity doctrine,
which asks courts "to determine infringement on an unpredictable, impressionistic basis");
Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 719, 746-49 (2009) (critiquing the current standard and pointing out the fact- and context-driven nature of copyright claims); Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of the Law: BringingSubstantial Similarity Down to
Earth, 98 DICK. L. REv. 181, 185 (1994) (noting a "lack of any substance to the concept of
substantial similarity as used to make the value judgment whether the defendant's copying
warrants liability"); Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 719, 719 (2010) (stating that the current tests for infringement
.make no sense"); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125
HARV. L. REv. 683, 687-88 (2012) (suggesting that the current test "makes impossible and
self-contradictory demands on factfmders").
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effect on the creative process if even generally careful artists risk becoming liable for large sums of money.24 Unfortunately, there is a
dearth of empirical research in the area of the substantial similarity test,
which makes conclusive determinations about judges' and juries' decision making more speculative. Recent work by Jamie Lund in the area
of composition copyrights represents an exception, and serves as a further wake-up call that we must probe into the way that courts handle
infringement litigation.2 5 Lund shows that mock jurors, when asked to
judge the similarity of two musical compositions, found them to be substantially similar over 86% of the time when they were performed similarly, and not substantially similar over 84% of the time when they were
performed differently, even though performance is supposed to be irrelevant in this context.26 This type of variability is disconcerting and
raises questions as to how juries (and judges) process information in
the copyright litigation context and whether the current standards increase the odds that plaintiffs can present the evidence such as to make
excessive claims for copyright protection. William Landes has suggested
that plaintiffs win a significant majority of copyright cases that make it
to trial, and that between 1978 and 2000, plaintiffs were successful
about 73% of the time.2 7 This figure included a win rate of 70% in jury
trials, which made up 27.7% of all copyright trials during the study period, and a win rate of 74% in judge trials. 28 Though a multitude of fac-

24 See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 23, at 89 ("This fear is created in part by the creativity
quantum paradox: it takes very little creativity to engender an entitlement to copyright
protection, but, at least rhetorically, seems to take much more creativity, effort and ingenuity to avoid infringing another work."). This tension is exacerbated by a number of factors,
including what one scholar has termed "copyfraud": claims of copyright protection for
materials where no such rights truly exist. See JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER
ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2 (2011).
25 SeeJamie Lund, An EmpiricalExamination of the Lay Listener Test in Music Composition
CopyrightInfringement,11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 137, 171 (2011).
26 Id. See generally Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray, Simulation, Realism, and the Study of
theJury, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 322 (Neil Brewer & Kipling
D. Williams eds., 2005) (discussing the use of mock juries to draw conclusions about actual
juries).
27 William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Pnoperty Litigation: Some Preliminary Results, 41 Hous. L. REv. 749, 774 tbl.5 (2004). These figures were calculated using data
from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and some scholars have expressed concerns about the overall accuracy of that data set. See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 1581, 1652-53
(2006).
28
Landes, supra note 27, at 772, 774 tbl.5. Landes indicates that cost considerations are
likely to drive parties toward judge trials rather than jury trials. Id. at 772.
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tors contribute to these types of figures, this Article explores the role
that cognitively skewed legal decision making may play.
In addition to the number of copyright issues raised by the explosion of user-generated creative content, two recent developments increase the urgency of clarifying and possibly changing the standard for
copyright infringement. First, the U.S. Supreme Court's 2012 decision
in Golan v. Holder retroactively lifted potentially millions of foreigncreated works out of the public domain, thus significantly increasing
the universe of works whose owners could9 become plaintiffs in a wide
variety of copyright infringement lawsuits." Second, Congress, scholars,
and the media have recently engaged in a spirited debate about the
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA), and related legislation designed to combat online copyright infringement and
other offenses.30 Although the public backlash against these bills may
have succeeded in preventing their passage, their proponents continue
with advocacy efforts, and more moderate legislation with similar basic
goals is already on the table. 31 Increased copyright enforcement,
whether through the possible rise in the number of plaintiffs or the
growth of legal tools available to pursue infringers, deepens the need to
examine critically the current doctrine of substantial similarity.
Part I of this Article begins by exploring the role that the reasonable man standard has traditionally played in the law and the main criti-

29See 132 S. Ct. 873, 905 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
30 See Stop Online Privacy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Preventing Real Online
Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act, S. 968, 112th Cong.
(2011). A number of scholars have analyzed and commented on these proposed pieces of
legislation. See, e.g., Bruce E. Boyden, Whats up with SOFA?, MARQUETTE U. L. SCH. FAc.
BLOG (Nov. 17, 2011), http://aw.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2011/11/17/whats-up-withsopa/; Eric Goldman, SOPA/PROTECT-IP/OPENLinkwrap#2, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG
(Jan. 5, 2012), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/01/sopaprotectipop.htm; Mark
Lemley et al., Don't Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REv. ONLINE 34 (2011); David G. Post,
SOFA and the Future of Internet Governance, VERDICT (Feb. 13, 2012), http://verdict.justia.
com/2012/02/13/sopa-and-the-future-of-internet-governance;
Laurence H. Tribe, The
"Stop Online Piracy Act" (SOFA) Violates the First Amendment (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.
scribd.com/doc/75153093/Tribe-Legis-Memo-on-SOPA-12-6-11-1. One of the more controversial aspects of SOPA is its prescription of criminal penalties; I have comprehensively
explored the debate over the role of such sanctions in intellectual property in my previous
work. See generally Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469 (2011) (discussing criminal sanctions for intellectual
property infringement and exploring various theories for the disparity between the criminal treatments for different types of infringement).
31 The most prominent of these is the Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital
Trade Act (the OPEN Act). Online Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, H.R.
3782, 112th Cong. (2012); see, e.g., Goldman, supranote 30 (discussing the OPEN Act).
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cisms that have been levied against the standard.3 2 It then discusses the
extent to which judges and jurors themselves tend to act reasonably in
their decision-making processes. 33 Part II analyzes the role of reasonableness and bias in the copyright context and discloses flaws in the
current standard for infringement and its application. 34 Part III addresses these defects through a model that embraces the subjective nature of copyright infringement determinations. Specifically, I propose
that courts should shift their focus toward the reaction of the intended
audience of works and begin allowing related evidence drawn from so35
cial science into copyright trials.

I.

THE REASONABLE MAN THROUGH THE LENS OF THE LAW

The reasonable man has played a key role in the law but has also
been the subject of many criticisms. Section A explores the use of the
reasonable man as a legal standard.3 6 Section B then identifies how bias
can play a role in determining what is reasonable for both juries and
37
judges.
A. The Reasonable Man as a Legal Standard
What constitutes reasonable conduct in the law defies precise and
uniform formulations and often comes down to an approximation of
whether the benefits of a specific set of actions exceed the costs.38 This

issue arose in 1947 in the classic torts case United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit faced the
question of when a barge owner should be liable for damage to other
vessels if his barge breaks away from its moorings.39 Judge Learned
Hand, eschewing any bright-line rule, stated that the duty of the barge
owner to prevent such damage depends on the probability that the
barge will break away, the seriousness of the likely damage, and the
burden of providing preventative measures. 40 It is thus a utilitarian cal-

32

See infra notes 38-63 and accompanying text.

33 See infra notes 64-144 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 145-252 and accompanying text.

35 See infra notes 253-288 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 38-63 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 64-144 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 39-63 and accompanying text.
39 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
40 Id. The idea of imposing liability on the cheapest cost avoider in a number of tort
settings and other contexts arises from a similar calculation. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI,
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culus, with some difficulties arising when not all the values that must
enter the calculus are of a monetary nature and when a degree of subjective valuation inevitably clouds the analysis. 41 Despite its difficulties,
this calculus has become one of the most famous in legal history and
was nicknamed the "Learned Hand Test," despite some evidence
sug42
proponent.
first
its
been
have
not
may
Hand
thatJudge
gesting
Be that as it may, the concept of the reasonable man itself undoubtedly possesses a long trail in Anglo-Saxon legal history. For instance, in his 1881 magnum opus, The Common Law, Oliver Wendell
Holmes expounded the virtues of using "the average man, the man of
ordinary intelligence and reasonable prudence 4 3 as the proper legal
yardstick to determine many forms of liability. Holmes explained that
the reasons the law seeks to be generally applicable, without consider44
ing individual variations in personality or background, are twofold.
First, measuring a person's abilities is much more difficult than judging
his "knowledge of law," since it is presumed "that every man knows the
law."4 5 Second, and more importantly, Holmes gave a utilitarian explanation for why a general, objective standard should prevail over a subjective one:
If, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (developing a theory
of accident law using an economic lens).
41 GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 161-62 n.218 (1985).

Of course, conceptions of

utilitarianism and its precise goals have varied greatly over time. See, e.g., MARTIN J. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING THE CRIMINAL: CULTURE, LAW, AND POLICY IN ENGLAND, 18301914, at 53 (1990) (stating that "in early Victorian England ... utilitarians themselves usually held an implicit moral agenda rather distinct from the more permissive modern-day
utilitarian philosophies").
42 CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 159 n.199 (comparing the test to one previously proposed by Henry Terry and noting that Judge Hand had most likely read Terry's work on
the subject) (citing Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42-43 (1915)).
43 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 51 (1881). Despite its fame, the

Learned Hand Test has not found universal acceptance in American case law, and some
scholars believe that most judges in negligence cases interpret due care as "reasonable
care, not rational care." See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence
Theory, 48 STAN. L. REv. 311, 361 (1996); see also Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1018 (1994) (summarizing the scholarly critiques). These scholars view Judge Hand as a proponent of the latter and see the former as more strongly
grounded in social contract theory. Keating, supra, at 360-61; see Gilles, supra, at 1018 (noting that some scholars claim that the existing "reasonable person standard ... marginalizes or even supplants the Hand Formula").
44 HOLMES, supra note 43, at 108.
45 Id.
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his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of
Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors
than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up to their
establish decline to take
standard, and the courts which they
46
his personal equation into account.
The only departures from this model that Holmes found justifiable
were those in which manifest defects like blindness or infancy truly prevented an individual from following usual legal norms, and in which
other members of society would be able to see these defects and take
additional precautions when dealing with such an impaired individual.47 The reality on the ground looked more complex, especially when
it came to mentally ill individuals. One scholar who specializes in the
period in which Holmes wrote has noted that "[t]he legal borderland
between competence and incompetence was indeed a broad and porous one in nineteenth-century America." 48 Rather than taking a rigid
view, judges fashioned pragmatic treatments that balanced Enlightenment notions of pure individual responsibility with the human behavior
that they encountered in the courtroom.4 9
In summary, the image emerges that the concept of reasonableness in the law uses utilitarian notions as both its foundation and its
guide. As to the first point, according to Holmes, we require reasonable
50
behavior from everyone because doing otherwise would harm society.
As to the second matter, reasonable behavior is behavior whose benefits
exceed the costs. 51 Of course, these propositions open an entire pantry

of cans of worms. How do we calculate the benefits? What are the costs?
And what do we do with actors that, due to their own fault or other fac46 Id. Indeed, a completely subjective legal standard has never been adopted and is an
inherently problematic idea given that legal fault is normally based precisely on deviations
from community norms. Warren A. Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1927).
47 HOLMES, supra note 43, at 109-10. One scholar explains that the "paradigm of objective-ideal-tempered-by-subjective-deviation" does not always lower the burden for groups
such as the disabled; rather, at times it places greater obligations on them (such as having
to use special glasses and other devices to increase general safety). Anita Bernstein, The
Communities That Make Standards of Care Possible,77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 735, 747-48 (2002).
48 Susanna L. Blumenthal, TheDefault LegalPerson,54 UCLA L. REv. 1135, 1203 (2007).
49 Id. at 1264. At the same time, criminal law was viewed as a tool to correct dangerous
personal flaws. MICHAEL MERANZE, PUNISHMENT, REVOLUTION, AND AUTHORITY IN PHILADELPHIA: 1760-1835, at 260 (1996). For example, the use of solitary confinement "promised to create a space where the reconstruction of individuals' subjectivity could occur." Id.
50 See HOLMES, supra note 43, at 108.
51 See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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tors, were unaware of some of the benefits or costs, or were unable to
complete this type of calculation altogether? This suggests the possibility that, in some situations, we are actually likely to turn to what the average person would do (a la Holmes), whether that turns out to satisfy
a grander utilitarian scheme or not. One of the possible assumptions
behind the decision to use the average person is the belief that if everyone acts roughly according to that standard, the utilitarian calculus
will be served about as well as pragmatically possible. Alan Miller and
Ronen Perry have teased apart positive versus normative theories of the
reasonable man, and their work, rooted in social theory, suggests that
"any statistical methodology used to study the reasonable person is necessarily invalid. Any judge or juror who claims to understand the nature
of the reasonable person from his or her familiarity with society is mistaken. 52 Hence, trying to use the average man as a welfare-maximizing
tool may be doomed on a fundamental level.
Even leaving aside Miller and Perry's concerns and adopting a
softer standard that tolerates some degree of measurement imperfections, if judges and juries take into account individual factors of defendants in some circumstances but not others, how can we know if the
utilitarian scheme is in fact being served? 53 After all, looking at individual factors means that conflicting values may or may not even each other out (e.g., punishing criminals for their deeds despite respecting that
their backgrounds may have contributed to their behavior), because
jurors may have tended to be skewed in one direction or another. The
Holmes model therefore largely comes across as aspirational rather
than actual. Indeed, at least one scholar has gone as far as asking why
"the [Learned Hand] test is still seen as the prototypical expression of
the law's fairness and objectivity rather than, for example, as a mechanism for facilitating the coercive exercise of social power.'4
52 Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 323, 328
(2012). The authors posit a set of five axioms necessary to any coherent theory of the reasonable man, and they show how any attempt to measure his nature is bound to violate
some segment of this set. Id.
53 These types of questions, among others, arise in the context of the debate between
rule and act utilitarianism. See, e.g., David 0. Brink, Mill's Ambivalence About Rights, 90 B.U.
L. REv. 1669, 1671-72 (2010) (discussing the distinctions between the two).
54 Nancy S. Ehrenreich, PluralistMyths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness
in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1178 (1990). This scholar argues that reasonableness serves as a mediator for the tension between the freedom of the individual and
the safety of society, and it thus serves as "a vehicle for importing a cost/benefit analysis
into the law, a method for distinguishing risk-creating conduct that social groups are free
to engage in from conduct that, because it threatens collective security, requires [legal]
regulation." Id. at 1183. Some scholars believe that even contract law, a realm supposedly
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Historically, some of the most significant attacks against the use of
the reasonable man standard have arisen from concerns about gender
and racial bias in the courtroom or even in the initial formulation of
legal rules. 5 5 A number of scholars have argued that the word "man" in
the reasonable man standard did not simply include both sexes but was
rather developed at a time when "virtually all judges, jurors, lawyers,
legislators, and law professors were men, and women had virtually no
independent public, economic, or legal identity. '' 56 Later, when courts
tried to reformulate the standard to become more gender neutral, su':h
as by referring to the "reasonable person," they still often incorporated
preexisting notions of the content of reasonableness that were largely
based on the average middle-class man. 57 One scholar argues that the
notion of reason has historically been used to disparage women, minorities, and individuals of limited education. 58 At least one other
scholar agrees, pointing out that often more powerful parties advocate
for an objective approach because "these standards always, and already,
59
reflect them and their culture."
driven by individual agreements free from societal pressures, is "a reflection of collective
determination, and thus inherently regulatory and coercive." MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION

OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 50

(1992) (discussing Arthur Corbin's work and his influences).
55 See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 41, at 23. judge Guido Calabresi explains how, in
England, the reasonable man was "the man on the Clapham Omnibus-a definition which
... always left [Calabresi] utterly cold since [he has] never met the Clapham Omnibus or
any man on it, and [he has] no idea why reasonableness should attach especially to those
who ride that line." Id. See generally BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920 (2001) (describing

the transformation of the law in response to a cultural shift away from purely "male" values).
56 CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASON-

ABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 6 (2000). See Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The
Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 807 (1993) ("The term 'reasonable man' is burdened by
an enormous amount of historical baggage. Dating back at least two hundred years, the
term undeniably evolved from extremely male-oriented legal and cultural roots.").
57 Id. at 6-7. Judge Calabresi has questioned the "reasonable person" standard, explaining that if "women are now expected to act as reasonable men did before ... rather
than men being expected to act, at least in part, as reasonable women did, then equality
may be there-but at the cost of cultural subjugation!" CALABRESI, supra note 40, at 29.
58 Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARv. L. REv. 445, 456
(1997). Bernstein calls the reasonable person standard "hollow" and argues that the idea
of a genderless victim of sexual harassment minimizes gender differences in the perception of sexual behavior in employment settings. Id. at 465. She proposes the introduction
of a "respectful person" standard to address the flaws of the reasonable person standard in
sexual harassment law. Id. at 483-506.
59 Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 813, 818
(1992). This objective versus subjective distinction parallels, in part, the tension between
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A number of approaches have tried to maintain a reasonableness
standard while lending more credence to victims of offenses such as
sexual crimes and torts. One proposal suggests flipping the analysis in
such cases away from a focus on the perpetrator's perspective (in other
words, how men would view the behavior of the usually male offenders
and their usually female victims) and toward a focus on "whether a reasonable woman would have acted as the perpetrator acted, as well as
whether a reasonable woman would have responded with behavior similar to the target's."60 One scholar has attacked such "reasonable woman"
standards as being sexist and stereotyping against both men and women, impossible to apply, and therefore unlikely to make a difference in
real cases.6 1 Whereas areas such as gender and race prove particularly
contentious in discussions about the reasonable man, the number of
characteristics that can influence one's conception of what is reasonable
or that can be used to tweak the standard is nearly infinite.
The remainder of this Article makes reference to three types of
reasonableness analyses. The first type, which is critiqued in this Section, deals with the question of whether a defendant's actions conform
to those of the reasonable man. The second type is employed when
judges have to decide on appeal whether ajury or ajudge below them
was reasonable (which includes the question of whether any reasonable
jury could reach a certain conclusion, such as in Scott). To shed light on
such decision making on the part ofjudges and juries, the next Section

the view that criminal behavior is caused by the individual due to faults of his own and the
view that crime is a product of social forces over which the individual has little control. See
generally MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA

CHICAGO (2003) (describing this tension and explaining how the rhetoric of social responsibility for crime brought about the creation of new services through the welfare state but
also an erosion of civil liberties, such as through eugenics and coerced medical treatment).
Of course, the question of causality in this context is complex and difficult to resolve. See
Thomas L. Haskell, Persons as Uncaused Causes:John Stuart Mill, the Spirit of Capitalism, and
the "Invention" of Formalism, in THE CULTURE OF THE MARKET: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 441,

441-45 (Thomas L. Haskell & Richard F. Teichgraeber III eds., 1993).
60FORELL & MATrHEWS, supra note 56, at 17.

61 Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual HarassmentLaw: Progress or Illusion?,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 619, 621-22 (1993). Specifically, Johnson argues that the reasonable woman standard is impossible to apply in sexual harassment contexts when it asks
that male triers of fact understand and apply the perspective of a reasonable
woman, even though men are, by definition, presumed unable to do so because of the allegedly characteristic male view that sexual harassment is harmless amusement and the supposed male bias that systematically ignores the
experiences of women.
Id. at 642.
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discusses some of the research on cognitive bias and how it delineates
62
the contours of these actors' ability to make optimal determinations.
The third type of reasonableness analysis enters the picture when a
judge or jury has to deduce what a reasonable man would think, and
Part II illuminates the boundaries of this process. 63 These three types of
analyses, as will become apparent, exhibit more commonalities than
differences in the kinds and levels of biases that infiltrate them, and
hence-after having classified them here-this Article at times alternates in their discussion without referring back to this taxonomy.
B. The ReasonableJury andJudge
1. Juries and Bias
The question of whether American law should provide for the
guaranteed right to be tried by a jury became an important point of
contention during the debates surrounding the adoption of the United
States Constitution, with the Anti-Federalists refusing to approve any
draft that did not include such a right.64 They believed that "the jury

was the best available means of thwarting unpopular laws enacted by an
insensitive national legislature[,] provided a method of protecting
debtors from inflexible rules in the regulation of commerce[, and]
could rein in corrupt or overactive judges."65 When it comes to the issue of bias, many in the legal community operate under the idea that
jury deliberations will minimize individual biases and lead to fairer outcomes. 66 Indeed, this belief seems to be at the very foundation of our
jury system.
The concern about the influence of individual biases, whether
based in jurors' backgrounds or particular idiosyncrasies, is not farfetched. An empirical study by Dan Kahan, David Hoffman, and Donald Braman about individuals' perceptions of the infamous car chase
video from the 2007 case, Scott v. Harris,proves illustrative.17 In Scott, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a police officer had not violated the
See infra notes 64-144 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 145-252 and accompanying text.
64 Stephan Landsman, The History and Objectives of the CivilJury System, in VERDICT: AsSESSING THE CIVILJURY SYSTEM 22 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
62
63

65 Id. at 38.
6 David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, & Daniel Kahneman, DeliberatingAbout Dollars: The
Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1139, 1157 (2000).
67 See generally Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 21 (describing the methodology

of the study and its results").
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Fourth Amendment when he intentionally hit the car of a driver who
refused to comply with police orders to pull over and instead led the
68
officers on a car chase; this collision left the driver a quadriplegic.
The Court concluded that "no reasonable jury" would disagree with the
contention that the car chase presented "a substantial and immediate
risk of serious physical injury to others," which meant that the officer's
efforts to interrupt the chase were reasonable and that he should win
on summary judgment. 69 In the study, Kahan and his coauthors showed
a diverse group of 1350 individuals the video of the car chase (which
the Supreme Court had placed on its website) and examined the individuals' views of the facts.7v The study found that although the majority
of subjects did indeed agree with the Court, members of some specific
subgroups did not; "African Americans, low-income workers, and residents of the Northeast, for example, tended to form more pro-plaintiff
views of the facts than did the Court. So did individuals who characterized themselves as liberals and Democrats., 71 This echoes earlier research, such as a study that found that preexisting attitudes toward the
criminal justice system and the police influenced the size of damage
72
awards that mock jurors were willing to give in a hypothetical case.
The search for an explanation of the dissonance between the
Court's "no reasonable jury" pronouncement and the outcome of Kahan's study yields problematic results. First, it is surely not plausible that

the racial or political groups that Kahan identified contain a lower percentage of reasonable people than other groups do. Another explanation is that although some study subjects would have reached a different conclusion based on their isolated judgment, no representative jury
would have disagreed with the Court. This could be true only if the
views of persons from certain groups are routinely steamrolled in the
jury deliberation process 73 (or if these individuals could never consti68Scott, 550 U.S. at 381.
69 Id.
70 Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 21, at 854-55.
71 Id. at 841.
72

Jonathan D. Casper et al., JurorDecision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13
LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 291, 307 (1989).
73Studying these matters empirically remains a complex task. A recent study suggests
that individuals of lower socioeconomic or educational status or from some specific back-

grounds (e.g., Asian American women) report a lower level of participation in jury deliberations. Erin York Cornwall & Valerie P. Hans, Representation Through Participation:A Multilevel Analysis of Jury Deliberations, 45 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 667, 681-86 (2011). African
American individuals, however, reported higher levels of participation than Caucasian or
Hispanic jurors. Id. at 681-82. Some limitations of this research include that the data was
based on self-reports and that "[a]ll participation is not equally relevant, meaningful, or
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74

tute the majority in any given jury). Indeed, there is actually some evidence that-unlike in the movie Twelve Angry Men in which one man
convinces his eleven fellow jurors that their initial conclusion in favor
of conviction was wrong- "the verdict favored by a majority of the jury
at the onset of deliberation usually prevails." 75 Other explanations exist
as well, but they begin to erode our understanding of the legal test as it
is currently stated. For instance, when the Court spoke of "no reasonable jury," it may have actually meant "very few reasonable juries." Taking this a step further, the possibility arises that (1) there is no such
thing as a reasonable jury, or (2) even if there
is, courts are hard76
pressed to discern what such ajury would do.
One related problem with objective standards is that they may
make it more likely that jurors, who view themselves as reasonable, will
ask themselves if they would have acted the same way as the defenpersuasive for the task of deliberating toward a verdict, so an important question for further research is how participation relates to other outcomes, such as influence, verdicts,
and juror satisfaction." Id. at 693.
74 In fact, minorities tend to be statistically underrepresented in jury pools. See, e.g.,
HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE
SEARCH FORJUSTICE 65 (1993) (showing that minorities and individuals of low educational

status are underrepresented on juries); David Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for Multiple Source Lists, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 776, 803-04 (1977) (finding significant disparities between the statistically expected and the actual representation of minorities on
juries); Nancy J. King & G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror Selection: Cross-Section by
Design 79 JUDICATURE 273, 273-74 (1996) (discussing the gravity of the problem). A number of scholars have expressed concern that the impact of unrepresentative jury composition on litigation outcomes might be to the disfavor of minorities. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal
Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 579 (1998) ("[H]istory is littered with ugly incidents of
juries using their powers to disadvantage minorities.") (citation omitted). In one study of
mock jurors, juror-defendant similarity led to in-group favorability when pro-conviction
evidence was weak or moderately strong, which increased the likelihood of a "not guilty"
verdict for in-group, as compared to out-group defendants. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Defendant-JurorSimilarity and Mock JurorJudgments, 19 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 545, 561 (1995). In a
follow-up study, however, evidence that overwhelmingly pointed to guilt influenced both
African American and Caucasian jurors to judge in-group, same-race defendants as more
guilty than out-group, other-race ones if the jurors anticipated being placed in a group
decision-making situation in which their own race would constitute a minority. Id.
75 Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by CivilJuries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 64, at 137,
159; see TWELVE ANGRY MEN (MetroGoldwynMayer Studios 1957). See generallyREID HASTIE
ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983) (studying jury decision making); Garold Stasser et al., The
Social Psychology ofJury Deliberations:Structure, Process, and Product, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE COURTROOM 221 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982) (discussing the process ofjury deliberations from foreman selection to the final decision).
76 See Miller & Perry, supra note 52, at 387 (discussing why any positive, rather than
normative, reasonable standard may be inherently bound to fail).
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dant.77 Jurors may thus implicitly view a defendant as similar to themselves with respect to gender, race, sexual orientation, and other attributes. 78 The solution is not as simple as moving to a subjective standard
of reasonableness, in the sense of assigning the defendant's attributes
to the reasonable person (including personality features), because then
all outside constraints disappear and "the reasonableness standard simply collapses." 79 In the end, various forms of distortions have been
found to enter juror decision making, regardless of whether defendants
are similar to or different from jurors. The remainder of this Section
discusses some of the relevant research on this topic and also shows that
judges remain far from immune to some of the same problems.80
In the 1970s, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel argued that the American jury system "represents a deep commitment to the use of laymen in
the administration of justice."81 Their seminal work for the University of
Chicago Jury Project sought to provide the empirical backing to support
the continued survival of the institution of the American jury. 2 George
Priest credits these scholars' efforts for the long-term trust that the
United States has placed in juries because their project's findings suggested "that the civil jury was a superior institution for adjudicating disputes involving complex societal values, that the jury served as an important instrument of popular control over law enforcement, and that
the jury brought a superior sense of social equity to the decisionmaking
process."8 3 Priest criticizes the wholesale endorsement of the KalvenZeisel view, however, and produces evidence to show that few jury trials
truly involve important societal values. 84 He concludes that the delays
and costs of such
trials weigh against the indiscriminate use of juries in
85
litigation.
civil
Though the hope for juries is that their group deliberation processes will bring extreme positions into the fold of an acceptable average
range, the phenomenon of group polarization can play a magnifying
rather than smoothing role. A number of studies involving mock juries
77 CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIM-

INAL COURTROOM
78 See id.

206 (2003).

79 Id. at 207.

80 See infra notes 81-144 and accompanying text.

& HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICANJURY 3 (1971).
See id. at 10.
83 George L. Priest, The Role of the Civii jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 161, 162 (citation omitted).
84 Id. at 172-81.
85 Id. at 165.
81 HARRY KALVENJR.
82
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have found that juries tend to award amounts that exceed the avt -age
of the amounts that individual jurors would have awarded prior to deliberations.8 6 One large study designed by David Schkade, Cass Sunstein, and Daniel Kahneman that involved 500 mock juries with a total
of 3000 mock jurors confirmed this finding: group deliberations consistently produce dollar verdicts that exceed the median of jurors' predeliberation determinations.87 The study's authors identified a number
of phenomena that may have contributed to this outcome, the key one
being a rhetorical asymmetry that leads jurors who have decided to give
a nonzero monetary award to perceive arguments in favor of increased
awards as more persuasive.88 Another proposed explanation related to
social comparison and the possibility that mock jurors did not want to
appear overly cautious compared to other individuals in the group,
which influenced their position. s9 In any case, the authors' overall conclusion is sobering: "Among many in the legal community there is the
hope, and indeed the conviction, that deliberation by a group of jurors
will overcome individual biases and produce more just and more predictable verdicts .... [O]ur findings lend no support to this view."90 Of
particular concern was that although the rhetorical asymmetry could
theoretically be counteracting other biases in the system (such as one
against personal injury plaintiffs or lawsuits), the asymmetry had a

86 MacCoun, supra note 75, at 160 (summarizing the findings of several mock jury
studies in this context). But seeJames H. Davis et al., Effects of Group Size and ProceduralInfluence on ConsensualJudg-nentsof Quantity: The Example of Damage Awards and Mock CivilJuries,
73J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 703, 713-14 (1997) (finding a reduction of mock civil
jury awards from a single mock juror to a group of six, and from a group of six to a group
of twelve in a setting involving a defendant with "deep pockets"). Davis and his coauthors
noted that their study conflicted with their own earlier findings (in which six-member
juries awarded higher amounts than single jurors), which they attributed to changing societal norms and a possible backlash against excessive tort awards in the years between
their two studies. Id. at 714 (citing James H. Davis et al., QuantitativeDecisions by Groups and
Individuals: Voting Procedures and Monetary Awards by Mock Civil Juries, 29 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 326 (1993)).
87 Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, supra note 66, at 1140-41.
88 Id. at 1161. The authors confirmed this result in a follow-up study, which found that
a sample of law students found it more difficult to argue for a lower, rather than a higher,
award when a (hypothetical) jury had already decided that liability existed and some
amount of damages would have to be paid. Id. at 1161-62.
89 Id. at 1166.
90 Id. at 1157. A different study found some reduction of variability among mock juries
as opposed to individual jurors, but there was still a great amount of unexplained variability. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., JurorJudgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of
Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. Rxv. 301, 317 (1998).

20121

Reasonable Copyright

"mechanical, case-independent quality."9' Other studies of group delib92
erations also found a similar award-increasing effect.
Among the potential other mechanisms that introduce distortions
into the legal system, individual hindsight bias has been one of the most
seriously studied in the legal context.9 3 For example, in a study of 277
mock jurors and 95 judges, Reid Hastie and Kip Viscusi presented subjects with a scenario in which a railroad company had a choice whether
to stop its operations until its tracks were improved or to continue running before repairs took place. 94 The study included both foresight
conditions (subjects had to decide whether the railroad should halt operations or keep working) and hindsight conditions (subjects had to
decide, upon learning that the railroad had continued to operate legally
and an accident took place that damaged a number of parties, whether
the railroad owed punitive damages in addition to pre-existing compensatory ones) .5 Subjects were told that only reckless conduct would suffice for an award of punitive damages, and that such conduct had to entail "a conscious choice of action, either with knowledge of serious
danger to others or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the
danger to any reasonable person." 96 Mock jurors displayed significant
hindsight bias on all related measures, whereas judges showed a lower
and often statistically insignificant tendency toward such bias. 97 Further,
Hastie and Viscusi compared the economically optimal outcome with
jurors' and judges' decisions, and their results suggested that judges

91Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, supra note 66, at 1172.
92 See, e.g., Diamond et al., supra note 90, at 316. In an earlier review of the literature
on individual versus group judgments, Norbert Kerr and his coauthors concluded that
there was no simple answer to the question of who exhibits more bias. Norbert L. Kerr et
al., Bias inJudgment: ComparingIndividuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 687, 713 (1996).
The scholars identified several factors that determined whether an individual or group
would be more or less likely to fall victim to various biases, including the size of a group,
the magnitude of individual bias, the location of the bias, the definition of the bias, the
normative ideal, and the nature of the group process. Id. In a later study, Kerr and other
scholars showed that mock juries were more biased than jurors in settings in which a defendant had a moderate probability of conviction in the absence of biasing information,
but that the trend was reversed in situations in which the probability of conviction was very
high or very low. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Jurors vs. Bias injuries: New Evidence from the
SDS Perspective, 80 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 70, 79-81
(1999).
93 See infra notes 94-118 and accompanying text.
94 Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can'tDo Well: The Jury'sPerformanceas a Risk
Manager,40 ARIZ. L. REv. 901, 905 (1998).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 904-05.
97 Id. at 906.
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were able to act rationally "in situations believed to create the most irrationality. In contrast, the citizen, mock-jurors do not appear to be sensitive to benefit-cost relationships." 98 These findings suggest that in some
settings, jurors struggle with the application of a standard that involves
determinations of what the reasonable man would do.
As with all studies, however, the Hastie-Viscusi study had a number
of limitations, including that it examined the decision making of individual jurors rather than their operations within a group. 99 Picking up
on this and other issues, some alternative explanations for the HastieViscusi findings have been proposed, most vocally by Richard Lempert.100 Lempert contends that (1) to the extent punitive damage
awards failed to act as a helpful risk management device, the reason was
not jury hindsight bias, and (2) there is no reason to believe that judges
fall prey to hindsight bias less frequently than jurors.'0 ' Lempert constructs a vigorous methodological attack against the Hastie-Viscusi
study. Among numerous other criticisms, Lempert argues that Hastie
and Viscusi did not consider the possibility of debiasing jurors, that
their figures do not actually demonstrate that judges are less likely than
jurors to be affected by hindsight bias, and that their baseline of what
would constitute a rational cost-benefit outcome was arbitrary."' Lempert concludes that "neither their empirical study nor their review of
literature ... show that judges are cognitively supethe psychological
10 3
juries."
to
rior

98

1d. at 908.
99 See id. at 905.
100 See Richard Lempert,Juries, Hindsight, and PunitiveDamage Awards: Failuresof a Social
Science Casefor Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 867, 874, 892 (1999).
101Id.
102Id. at 870, 882-84, 886. Lempert also questions the use of hindsight bias terminol-

ogy in this context given that he believes that "ex post risk estimates are likely to be more
accurate than ex ante estimates." Id. at 874. This inquiry parallels the argument that hindsight "represents fully rational Bayesian updating." Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as
Part of a RhetoricalDuet: A Response tojolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1577, 1584
(1998); see also Mark Kelman et al., Decomposing Hindsight Bias, 16 J. RisK & UNCERTAINTY
251, 258 (1998) (defending some forms of hindsight bias as helpful). Critics have replied,
however, that "Kelman does not say anything to undermine the central empirical work on
hindsight bias." Christine Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50
STAN. L. REv.1593, 1606 (1998).
103 Lempert, supra note 100, at 892. As a general matter, some recent brain imaging
work has also suggested that a number of individuals experience an actual decrease in
intelligence and cognitive functioning in group contexts. Kenneth T. Kishida et al., Implicit
Signals in Small Group Settings and Their Impact on the Expression of Cognitive Capacity and Associated Brain Responses, 367 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y B 704, 713-14 (2012).
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Although I similarly question the superiority of judges when it
comes to matters of cognitive bias, the studies that show distinct risks
from bias on the part of juries do not end with the Hastie-Viscusi findings. For example, one study assessed mock jurors for their foresight
versus hindsight assessments of whether a municipality should take or
have taken measures to prevent against flood damage imposed on riparian property owners. 1°4 In the foresight condition, only 24% of subjects recommended a particular safety measure, whereas in the hindsight condition, 56.9% of subjects stated that the measure should have
been taken. 10 5 Of the subjects in the hindsight condition, half were exposed to materials tailored to debias them by specifically warning them
against hindsight bias, but this measure made no difference in the subjects' determinations. 106
A different study had mock jurors (consisting of adults from an
actual jury pool and students) determine whether a plaintiff should
receive compensatory and punitive damages for the behavior that policemen had inflicted upon him during a search of his home that potentially violated his civil rights. 0 7 The researchers found fairly consistent hindsight bias in mock jurors' determinations; mock jurors tended
to find for police liability and give increased compensatory and punitive damages at a greater rate when they believed that the search inculpated rather than exculpated the plaintiff.108 In this study, subjects were
asked to determine whether "a reasonable person, knowing what the
officers knew prior to entering the apartment, [would believe that the
plaintiff] was guilty of committing a crime."1 09 The answer to this question was not supposed to be based on subsequent events, but the data
suggests the opposite." 0
This finding is consistent with those of other studies, such as one
that examined mock jurors' impressions of a therapist's actions in light
of the possibility that the therapist's patient may pose a harm to other

104Kim A. Kamin & JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Ex Post - Ex Ante: DeterminingLiability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 89,93 (1995).
105 Id. at 98.
106 Id. Two of the major limitations of the Kamin-Rachlinski study are that the sample
size was small and that no deliberations took place. See id. at 94-98.
107 Casper et al., supra note 72, at 294-97.
108 Id. at 298-99. The reverse halo effect, defined later in this Article, may have played

a role in that determination as well. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
109 Casper et al., supra note 72, at 296.
110 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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people.11 1 As predicted, subjects rated the therapist's actions as less reasonable and more negligent when told that the patient later became
violent toward others, and they viewed the violence as more foreseeable
when they believed that it had actually occurred." 2 Though many of
the mock juror studies on hindsight bias examined only individuals rather than groups, group deliberations do not eliminate the risk of
hindsight bias because the problem of group polarization reduces
the
3
potential debiasing effects that might arise from open debate.'
In the intellectual property arena, one of the key studies of mock
jurors and hindsight bias was performed by Gregory Mandel, whose
empirical work focused on individuals' interpretations of the nonobviousness requirement of patent law." 4 The study examined this particular requirement because of its central importance in patent cases,
in which it is the most frequently litigated issue related to the validity1of
15
patents and the one most likely to cause a patent to be invalidated.
The law student subjects in Mandel's study each received one of two
hypothetical fact patterns, as well as (1) data about the field of an invention, (2) a set of prior art information, and (3) details about a problem on which an inventor was working. 11 6 In the hindsight condition,
subjects also received a one-sentence addition stating that the inventor
had come up with a solution and explaining what that solution was; in
the third condition (the so-called "debiasing" one), the study explained
the issue of hindsight to subjects and advised them not to fall prey to

"ISee Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinationsof Negligence and the HindsightBias,
20 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 501, 507 (1996).
112 Id. at 507, 509-10.
113 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory ofJudging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REv. 571, 587 n.76 (1998). One obstacle to debiasing which remains is that "[e]ven
when people understand the existence of cognitive biases on a theoretical level, they still
tend to believe that their own judgment remains unaffected." Cassandra Burke Robertson,
Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REv. 1, 11 (2009) (citing Cynthia McPherson Frantz, I AM Being Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block to Seeing Both Sides, 28
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 157, 161-63 (2006) (failing to correct a bias in judgment
toward character profiles the subjects indicated they personally liked)). Some scholars
have hypothesized that hindsight bias is related to both a need for predictability and the
desire to protect self-presentation. See, e.g., Jennifer D. Campbell & Abraham Tesser, MotivationalInterpretationsof Hindsight Bias: An Individual Difference Analysis, 51 J. PERSONALITY
605, 607 (1983).
114 Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: EmpiricalDemonstration That the Hindsight
Bias Renders PatentDecisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1406-20(2006).
115 Id. at 1398 (citingJohn R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, EmpiricalEvidenceon the Validity
of LitigatedPatents,26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208-09 (1998)).
116 Mandel, supra note 114, at 1406.
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it.117 There was a wide chasm between the foresight and hindsight conditions for each of the two fact patterns (24% versus 76%, and 23% versus 59%, respectively), and the debiasing condition had only a marginal
18
effect on skewed reasoning.
2. Judges and Bias
Judges face their own set of challenges in decision making," 9 including the hindsight bias discussed for juries. In a study of 167 judges,
one team of researchers examined judicial behavior along five cognitive
biases (anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, the representativeness heuristic, and egocentric biases) and found that although judges were a bit
less likely to fall prey to two of them (framing effects and the representativeness heuristic, which means "ignoring important background statistical information in favor of individuating information"), all five cognitive biases had a strong impact on their decision making. 120 The
research on hindsight bias and judges has not been replicated in every
setting. Whereas some scholars view the general evidence as indicating
the existence of hindsight bias in judicial determinations of probable
cause, 121 at least one study found no bias between foresight and hindsight conditions in that particular context. 122 Specifically, the study's authors found that although hindsight did affect judges' performance in
predicting the probable outcome of a search, it did not sway their legal
determinations.1 23 This work potentially suggests that the degree of
117 Id. at 1407-08.
118 Id. at 1409. Mandel also discusses a number of reasons why his study may actually

underestimate the true amount of hindsight bias. Id.
119 See generally Anthony Champagne & Stuart Nagel, The Psychology ofJudging, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM,

supra note 75, at 257 (discussing judges' cognitive proc-

essing).
120 Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 784, 816
(2001). The same authors also examined the effect of specialization in a study of bankruptcy judges and found that these judges do at least as well as generalist judges, but that
their political views are more strongly linked to some case outcomes; the authors concluded that specialization may engender a side effect of politicization. Jeffrey Rachlinski et
al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge's Mind, 86 B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1230-31 (2006).
121 See Andrew E. Taslitz &James Coleman, Foreword: The Death of Probable Cause, LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS.,
122 Jeffrey

Summer 2010, at i, viii.

J. Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, Probability,and Hindsight 5 (Vanderbilt Pub.
Law Research Paper, Paper No. 11-25), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1877125. The authors "suspect that in actual cases, judges would find it much
more difficult to suppress damning evidence against a defendant that they strongly believe to
be guilty than they would in [the] hypothetical scenarios." Id. at 26.
123 Id. at 24; see also AndrewJ. Wistrich et al., CanJudges Ignore InadmissibleInformation?
The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding,153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1323 (2005) (discussing a
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hindsight bias that judges (and perhaps juries) exhibit could be somewhat context-dependent, although the weight of the empirical evidence
does suggest that the likelihood of finding differences between foresight
124
and hindsight conditions is fairly large.
Judges also struggle when trying to live up to or impose standards
of reasonableness. For instance, for the most significant dispositive motions of summary judgment, judges are supposed to dismiss cases if no
reasonable jury would be able to find for the plaintiff. 1 25 Suja Thomas
argues, however, that what judges do is in fact-impermissibly- substitute their own judgment of the facts for any genuine analysis of what a
reasonable jury would do. 126 Thomas bases this conclusion on numerous factors, including that judges frequently disagree about what juries
would find and that judges seem to interchangeably analyze what a single juror-as opposed to an actual jury-would find, which may lead to
a different outcome due to group decision-making dynamics. 127 In the
end, Thomas believes that the entire enterprise of deciding dispositive
1 28
motions based on the reasonable jury standard is fatally flawed.
If a party appeals the decision of a trial court judge, the appellate
court will at times examine the judge's behavior for abuse of discretion
29
and ask "if no reasonable judge could logically make that decision."
Of course, appellate judges at any level are subject to similar biases as
trial court judges. At every level of decision making, there is thus a tension between, on the one hand, the mandate to act reasonably and assess the actors below based on objective criteria, and, on the other
hand, the pervasive cognitive biases that permeate attempts to engage
previous study by the same authors that suggested a lack of hindsight bias in some settings,
but also a general inability on the part of judges to disregard relevant inadmissible evidence).
124 See supra notes 93-121 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of hindsight bias in a wide variety of scenarios).
125 Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure,50 B.C. L. REv. 759, 759 (2009)
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
6
12 Id. at 769. This is somewhat analogous to the criticism in the patent context that the
Federal Circuit at times substitutes its own judgment for that of district courts, which results in problems such as inconsistent and panel-specific decisions. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretationat the FederalCircuit, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1026-27 (2007); Lauren Maida, Note, Patent Claim Construction:It's Not
a PureMatter of Law, So Why Isn't the Federal Circuit Giving the District Courts the Deference They
Deserve?, 30 CARmozo L. REv.1773, 1773-74 (2009).
127Thomas, supra note 125, at 770-73.
128 See id. at 784.
129 Richard M. Markus, A Better Standardfor Reviewing Discretion, 2004 UTAH L. REv.
1279, 1279. This has, in turn, been interpreted to mean that the outcome must blatantly
violate fact and logic for the standard to be met. Id. at n.3.
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in either of these actions. The hope of the judicial system is that the
biases of different actors will be eliminated or at least sufficiently reduced as a case makes its way through the appellate process. For a variety of reasons, however, many cases are never appealed.130 Further, numerous decisions (such as a jury's determination about a set of facts)
are subject to such a high standard of review-and setting aside decisions below increases the strain on limited judicial resources by such a
large amount-that they are effectively likely to be set aside only a small
percentage of the time whether they are "reasonable" or not.131 Appellate decisions that set aside judicial decisions below can be equally
problematic; after all, disagreements between a higher and a lower
court result in an outcome in which the lower court judge or judges are
declared unreasonable, but "[o]utside of some finding of impropriety
or mental disability .. . judges should be considered reasonable fact-

finders."1 32 One could argue that even a reasonable fact finder can have
an unreasonable moment or make a poor decision in a case without
being globally "unreasonable." At the same time, another possibility
presents itself: that different reasonable decisionmakers could arrive at
different outcomes. This possibility will fail to be acknowledged in a
universe in which an appellate judge actually asks herself, explicitly or
implicitly, only what she thinks about the evidence. Kahan and his coauthors have advocated for humility on the part of each judge:
[Before a judge decides] that no reasonable juror could find
such facts, the judge should try to imagine who those potential jurors might be. If, as will usually be true, she cannot identify them, or can conjure only the random faces of imaginary
statistical outliers, she should proceed to decide the case
summarily. But if instead she can form a concrete picture of
the dissenting jurors, and they are people who bear recognizable identity-defining characteristics-demographic, cultural,
political, or otherwise-she should stop and think hard. Due
humility obliges her to consider whether privileging her own
view of the facts risks conveying a denigrating and exclusion-

130 One

study estimates both the appeals rate and the reversal rate for federal civil tri-

als (for both judge and jury trials) to be about twenty-one percent. Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Appealfrom Jury orJudge Trial: Defendants'Advantage,3 Am. L. & ECON.
REv. 125, 130 (2001).
131Markus, supra note 129, at 1282.
132Thomas, supra note 125, at 781.
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If it does,
ary message to members of such subcommunities.
133
path.
different
a
choose
she should
This approach raises the question of why individual (rather than groupbased) idiosyncrasies should necessarily be equated with a higher likelihood of unreasonableness-lest we simply define reasonableness as
the average or median view. Moreover, even if one was willing to completely embrace Kahan and his coauthors' framework, there are significant reasons to question whether and how judges could engage in the
complex mental exercise that they propose.13 4 Despite these difficulties,
the proposal deserves respect for attempting to grapple with one of society's oldest and most complex problems: how to bridge the intersubjective gap.
Indeed, in the end, judges and juries likely struggle with more similar problems than different ones. The high rate of judge-jury agreement in both the criminal and civil jury literatures provides some possible evidence that a number of the difficulties in decision making arise
from causes unrelated to the dyads of professional versus amateur judging and of individual versus group decision making.13 5 For instance, in
Kalven and Zeisel's research for the University of Chicago Jury Project,
judges disagreed with the findings of criminal juries only about 20% of
the time.13 6 The differences generally arose from greater leniency on
the part of juries, l1 7 and Kalven remarked separately that the observed
degree of difference was such as to confirm the quality of the jury's
work but still allowed it "to perform a distinctive function. " ' Another
team of researchers partially replicated the Kalven-Zeisel study based
on data from 300 criminal trials in four locales and found over 70%
33

Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 21, at 898-99.
One scholar argues that Kahan asks judges for the impossible, and that "there is no
evidence that judges have the ability to put aside their views and assess evidence based on
another person's or group's viewpoint." Thomas, supra note 125, at 780. Related proposals
are similarly problematic. For instance, one scholar has proposed jury instructions that
would have jurors switch in their heads the genders, races, and/or sexual orientations of
defendants and victims to identify whether bias is entering their determinations. LEE, supra
note 77, at 252-53. This proposal would create a number of complications: it would be
difficult to apply and would increase the risk that jurors would engage in various forms of
stereotyping. Caroline Forell, Homicide and the Unreasonable Man, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
597, 613-14 (2004) (reviewing LEE, supra note 77).
135 See infra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
I36KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 81, at 59.
137 RobertJ. MacCoun & Norbert L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation:
Jurors' Bias for Leniency, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 30 (1988) (identifying
group deliberations as a factor in the increased leniency ofjuries over judges).
138 Harry Kalven,Jr., TheDignity of the CivilJury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1064 (1964).
1

134
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judge-jury agreement. 39 Further, another study found a rate of agreement of just over 71% for criminal cases (with the vast majority of the
disagreement stemming from jury acquittals) and nearly 63% for civil
cases (with an even split in the direction of the disagreement). 140
In a broad review of the empirical literature that compares judges
and juries across different settings, one scholar concluded that
the decisionmaking of judges and jurors is strikingly similar.
While there is evidence of some differences, there is a high
degree of agreement between the groups, they appear to decide real cases quite similarly, and they show a great deal of
similarity in responding to simulated cases designed
to exam14 1
ine a variety of legal decisionmaking processes.
She cautioned, however, that the high rates of agreement between the
two groups were not guarantees of the accuracy of legal decisions by
judges and juries. 142 Indeed, we know that they both at times make similar types of errors that could result in agreement, including in matters
such as the proper interpretation of scientific and statistical information or as attempts to ignore inadmissible evidence.1 43 The next Part
shows how the characteristics of copyrightable materials and related
laws are such that both judges and juries are likely to struggle with applying copyright's version of the reasonable man standard. 1 " The hazards of cognitive bias reach dangerous heights in the context of ambiguous subject matters, and the attempt to cling to an officially objective
standard may lead to the least objective outcome of them all.

139 Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-JuryAgreement in Criminal Cases: A PartialReplication
of Kalven and Zeisel's The American Jury, 2J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 173 (2005).
140 Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning
and Its Effect, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 48 (1994).
141 Jennifer K. Robbennolt, EvaluatingJuries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for
Judging, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 469, 502 (2005).
142 Id. at 505.
143 Id. Other scholars have suggested that "Uludges are likely to make better decisions

in certain circumstances because their training and experience will enable them to avoid
the more pernicious effects of such cognitive decision-making phenomena as the representativeness heuristic." Guthrie et al., supra note 118, at 827. They have recognized, however, that "group decision making or the insulation afforded by a judicial gatekeeper may
enable juries to make better decisions than judges in other circumstances." Id.; see also
Jeffrey Kerwin & David R. Shaffer, Mock Jurors Versus Mock Juries: The Role ofDeliberations in
Reactions to Inadmissible Testimony, 20 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 153, 159-60
(1994) (finding that mock juries followed judicial instructions to ignore inadmissible testimony better than individual mock jurors).
144 See infra notes 145-252 and accompanying text.
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THE REASONABLE MAN AND COPYRIGHT LAW

As Part I shows, legal decision making by both judges and juries
145
can suffer from some degree of cognitive bias and related distortions.
These effects, however, take on a special significance in copyright law.
First, the old adage "de gustibus et coloribus non est disputandum" ("there is
no arguing about tastes and colors") is nowhere more recognized than
in areas such as art, music, and literature. Nevertheless, copyright lawsuits leave attorneys and legal decisionmakers with no choice but to
argue about matters usually left to personal taste. One of the goals of
this Article is to issue a call to remind ourselves of the inherent subjectivity of the decision-making enterprise. Indeed, though copyright law
has made repeated attempts to remain value-neutral, the boundary between aesthetic and legal determinations is elusive. 146 This Part shows
how most courts have decided to handle the various complex elements
of copyright infringement, and then discusses the problems that ambiguity and cognitive biases raise in this context.147 Section A explores the
various tests for copyright infringement used by different U.S. Courts of
Appeals. 148 Section B argues that the ambiguity of copyright law prevents judges and juries from applying these tests consistently.149 Section
C discusses how cognitive biases are likely to affect judges' and juries'
150
analyses of copyright infringement.
A. The Testsfor CopyrightInfringement
1. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Infringement
A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement by proving ownership of a valid copyright and a violation of one or
more of the plaintiffs exclusive rights listed under 17 U.S.C. § 106.151

145 See supra notes 36-144 and accompanying text.
146 See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 247, 249
(1998); see also Christine Haight Farley,JudgingArt, 79 TUL. L. REv. 805, 808 (2005) (arguing that courts are regularly forced to confront the question of "what is art?"); Barton
Beebe, Bleistein; or, Intellectual Property Law and the Problem of Aesthetic Progress (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that "intellectual property law has
refused to reconcile the law's fundamental purpose, the promotion of progress, with the
aesthetic").
147 See infra notes 151-252 and accompanying text.
148 See infra notes 151-192 and accompanying text.
149 See infra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
150 See infra notes 204-252 and accompanying text.
151 The statute provides:
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Unless the defendant challenges the validity of the plaintiffs copyright,
typically by arguing that the work is not one that is protectable under
copyright law, the issue will be whether or not the defendant violated
one or more of the plaintiffs exclusive rights. In cases in which the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant made an unlawful reproduction of
the plaintiffs work, the plaintiff must show proof of copying. 152 Such
copying can be proven either by direct or, more frequently, indirect
(circumstantial) evidence.1 5 3 "[W]here there are striking similarities
probative of copying, proof of access may be inferred."1 54 Proving copying through evidence of access and/or similarities establishes so-called
"probative similarity." 155 The understanding is that "if the defendant had
access to the plaintiffs work and the defendant's work is similar enough
to the plaintiffs, the most plausible inference is that the defendant actually copied from the plaintiff.'' 1 56 Copying itself, however, is not necessarily illegal, and replicating de minimis amounts of copyrightable materials is not actionable. 157 Rather, the copying must have been
"substantial" to be infringing; this represents "one of the most difficult

Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of the copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3)to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
152 See, e.g., Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Laureyssens v. Idea
Grp, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1992)).
153 See Lemley, supra note 23, at 719.
154 Repp, 132 F.3d at 889 (citing Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 471 (2d Cir. 1995)).
155 Id. at n.1. The term "probative similarity" is often attributed to Alan Latman. See generally Alan Latman, "ProbativeSimilarity" as Proofof Copying.- Toward DispellingSome Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. Rv. 1187 (1990) (urging the adoption of the term "probative similarity" as a term separate from "substantial similarity" in the proof-of-copying step of
copyright infringement).
156 Lemley, supra note 23, at 720.
i57Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 n.34 (1984).
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questions in copyright
law, and one that is the least susceptible of help158

ful generalizations."

2. The Traditional Test-Arnstein v. Porter
To determine whether substantial similarity is present, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit developed a two-step test for
copyright infringement that most other circuits have followed in some
form. 159 The Second Circuit created this test in the 1946 case Arnstein v.

Porter,in which Ira Arnstein accused his fellow songwriter Cole Porter
of ripping off Arnstein's compositions for several successful songs.160
The court held that, as a first step, "[i]f there is evidence of access and
similarities exist, then the trier of the facts must determine whether the
similarities are sufficient to prove copying. On this issue, analysis ('dissection') is relevant, and the testimony of experts may be received to
aid the trier of the facts." 6 1 Some scholars have remarked that the first
step of this analysis has lost much of its weight since the advent of the
Internet because now most materials are easily available, and hence
access can virtually be assumed. 162 If the first prong of the test is no
longer a barrier in many cases, this only emphasizes the need to employ
a proper analysis under the second prong.
Under Arnstein, if the court establishes that copying took place, it
must next decide whether the copying was illicit and thus constituted
unlawful appropriation. 163 The answer to this question is determined by
examining the response of the ordinary observer, so neither dissection
nor expert testimony is considered relevant. 164 The essential inquiry for
the second step in Arnstein was "whether defendant took from plain158

4

MELVILLE

B.

NIMMER

&

DAVID

NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§ 13.03[A]

(2011).
159This Subsection and those that follow present a basic overview of the key tests that
courts have used to determine copyright infringement. See generally ROBERT C. OSTERBERG
& ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT LAw ch. 3 (2011) (providing a more detailed discussion of the specific tests used in each circuit).
160154 F.2d 464, 467-68 (2d Cir. 1946).
161 Id. at 468.
162 See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 23, at 84 (citing Karen Bevill, Note, Copyright Infringement

and Access: Has the Access Requirement Lost its Probative Value?, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 311, 31112 (1999).
16
3 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
164 Id. There is some disagreement as to what the Arnstein court meant to state on this
subject, but this is how Arnstein has historically been interpreted. See Lemley, supra note 23,
at 722; see also Stephanie J. Jones, Music Copyright in Theory and Practice: An Improved Approachfor DeterminingSubstantialSimilarity, 31 DUQ. L. REv. 277, 285-90 (1993) (providing
more information on this subject).
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tiff's works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who
comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the
plaintiff."165 It is telling that the test was not without controversy from
the start, with the dissenting judge in Arnstein stating that "after reof the records, I could not find therein what my brothpeated hearings
166
ers found.,
3. The Kroffi Approach
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also took a twostep approach in 1977 in its leading case Sid & Marty Kroffi Television
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.167 The first step, which establishes
probative similarity, is the "extrinsic" step through which courts examine a list of particular criteria to determine the substantial similarity of
ideas with the aid of expert testimony and analytic dissection. 16s For the
determination of unlawful appropriation, the court refers to an "intrinsic" step, which looks at "the response of the ordinary reasonable person" to determine the substantial similarity of expression; at 69this stage,
the court prohibits the use of expert testimony or dissection.'
The primary difference between the Ninth Circuit's two-step analysis and the Second Circuit's test, aside from the Ninth Circuit's "focus
on the comparison of ideas as well as expression, ' 70 is "that the Ninth
Circuit puts more emphasis than the Second on the ordinary observer
side of the analysis-what it calls the 'intrinsic' inquiry.""' Additionally,
"courts that follow Krofft are more willing to treat as the 'ordinary observer' the likely customer of the copyrighted products, which may or
may not be a member of the jury."1 72 As a result, when the intended au-

165Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
166 Id. at 476 (Clark, J., dissenting).
167 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977), superseded by statute on other grounds, 17 U.S.C.

§ 504(b) (2006).
l8Id.
169 Id. The District of Oregon offers a recent application of the Krofft test. See Erickson
v. Blake, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135-40 (D. Or. 2012) (dismissing a copyright infringement
case-in which the plaintiff-owner of the work "Pi Symphony" argued that the defendant's
work, "What Pi Sounds Like," infringed when both transposed the digits of the number pi
to music-by holding that pi was a non-copyrightable fact and that the idea to transpose its
digits to music was also non-copyrightable).
170Lemley, supra note 23, at 724.
171Id.

at 725.

at 729; see also Austin Padgett, Note, The Rhetoric of Predictability:Reclaiming the Lay
Ear in Music Copyright Infringement Litigation, 7 PIERCE L. Rav. 125, 132 (2008) (discussing
172Id.
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dience is an "extraordinary observer," courts may allow expert testimony, although generally prohibited under the intrinsic73 test, to help
legal decisionmakers understand specialists' perspectives.
4. Other Methods
Although most circuits have adopted either the Arnstein or the
Krofft test, courts have occasionally changed or modified these approaches under certain circumstances.
a. The Shaw v. Lindheim Modification of the Krofft Approach
In 1990, in Shaw v. Lindheim, the Ninth Circuit tried to clarify the
relationship between substantial similarity and the idea-expression dichotomy by changing the two-step test from Krofft. 174 In the years after
Kroff, district courts began to refer to a standardized list of elements
when they applied Kroffl's extrinsic step to literary works. 1 75 As a result
of this "checklist of elements" approach, the Shaw court felt that the
extrinsic test was "more sensibly described as an objective ... analysis of
expression, having strayed from Kroffl's division between expression
and ideas."' 76 With respect to the intrinsic test, the court viewed it as a
subjective test of expression, leaving the original Kroffl conception unchanged.177 One observer concluded that "Shaw's emphasis on comparing copied expression, not ideas, is thoroughly consistent with the ideaexpression distinction and the constitutional principles of copyright
law. ,,178

The Shaw court also held that, when it comes to summary judgment, "satisfaction of the extrinsic test creates a triable issue of fact in a
[literary] copyright action. " ' 79 Thus, once the plaintiff meets the extrinsic test, proving an objective similarity of expression, "it is improper
the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the ordinary observer in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905
F.2d 731, 734 (4th Cir. 1990)).
173Kohus v.Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 857 (6th Cir. 2003).
174 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990); Thomas M. Cunningham, Note, Extending
Shaw v. Lindheim: Substantial Similarity and the Idea-Expression Distinction in Copyright of NonLiterarySubject Matter, 55 U. P=rr. L. REv.239, 242, 248 (1993).
175 Cunningham, supra note 174, at 248.
176 Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1357.
177 Id. Although the Shaw court's holding was limited to literary works, the Ninth Circuit applied it to a computer program copyright as well because of the parallels it drew
between some such programs and literary works. See Brown Bag Software v. Symantec
Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992).
178 Cunningham, supra note 174, at 249.
179Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1359.
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for a court to find ... that there is no substantial similarity as a matter
of law."180 This part of the test is supposed to ensure that the plaintiff
will get to the jury once an objective showing of similarity has been
made and to prevent judges from "arbitrarily decid[ing] the infringement question on the basis of their own subjective opinions." 181 The
terminology gets rather confusing here because the court talks about
the second step of Krofft, which seeks to determine "the response of the
ordinary reasonable person" 18 2 (normally considered an objective test),
as a subjective determination that is "no more suitable for a judge than
for a jury."1 83 The tension in terminology is rather telling because the
court is conflating what the jury subjectively experiences with what the
hypothetical ordinary observer himself would perceive.
The jury instructions used in various circuits prove illuminating on
this last point. Some of them ask jurors to determine what an "ordinary
reasonable person" would find substantially similar, 184 whereas others
make no reference to the reasonable person and tell jurors to determine
whether two works are substantially similar in the abstract,18 5 and yet others speak of the "average lay observer" but equate that concept with the
jurors themselves. 186 The current approaches to substantial similarity de180Id.
181Cunningham,

supra note 174, at 251.
F.2d at 1358 (citing Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164).
83
1 Id. at 1360.
184 See, e.g., Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 453 n.1
(7th Cir. 2001) ("Defendant's sculpture is 'substantially similar' to plaintiffs copyright if
an ordinary reasonable person, unless he or she set out to detect disparities between the
plaintiffs and defendant's sculptures, would be disposed to overlook the disparities and
regard their aesthetic appeal as the same."); Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1049-50
(10th Cir. 1995) ("In applying [the subjective or intrinsic] test, you must decide or determine whether an ordinary, reasonable, non-expert person would conclude that the total
concept and feel of [the defendant's song] is substantially similar to the total concept and
feel of [the plaintiff's song]."); see also OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 159, app. B
(collecting these and other jury instructions).
185See, e.g., Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1564 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) ("Substantial similarity may exist where an important part of the mask work is
copied, even though the percentage of the entire chip which is copied may be relatively
small.").
186 See, e.g., OSTERBIERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 159, app. B, at B-3 (citing Gaste v.
Kaiserman, 683 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y 1988), aff'd 863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988)) ("Substantial similarity means that the average lay observer would recognize the alleged infringing
work as having been derived from the copyrighted work.... [W]hat it requires ...as lay
listeners, that is as non-professional listeners, [is that] you would recognize the one as having been derived from the other."). Though one must exercise caution in generalizing,
some previous research indicates that juries spend little time discussing standards of proof,
which may affect how they process these types of instructions in the copyright context as
well. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 75, at 86-87. The research on jurors' general comprehen182 Shaw, 919
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veloped in Arnstein and Krofft thus not only are problematic from a cognitive perspective in the ways described in this Article,1 87 but also are ap188
plied inconsistently as evidenced by the jury instructions we see.
b. Software Cases
One clear exception to the two-step analyses in Arnstein and Krofft
are software cases, in which courts usually allow expert testimony not
only on the question of copying, but also on misappropriation. 189 In
1992, in Computer Associates Internationalv. Altai, Inc., the Second Circuit
stated that it would "leave it to the discretion of the district court to decide to what extent, if any, expert opinion, regarding the highly technical nature of computer programs, is warranted in a given case." 190 The
Altai court also adopted an "abstraction-filtration-comparison" framework for evaluating substantial similarity.a 9 I mention the software doctrine here because, as I will discuss below, Mark Lemley has proposed
that courts adopt a similar framework for non-software copyright in192
fringement cases.
B. The Problem of Ambiguity in CopyrightInfringement Cases
The subject matters that copyright law covers inherently involve
complex human responses before litigation even enters the picture.
Having jurors and judges apply difficult and at times confusing tests to
already vague materials means that they will often have to make deci-

sion of jury instructions raises concerns in its own right, with many jurors failing to completely understand instructions despite expressing great confidence in their own understanding but diminished confidence in their fellow jurors'. See Shari Seidman Diamond,
What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve as Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 64, at 282, 295-97; see alsoJames R.P. Ogloff &
V. Gordon Rose, The Conprehension ofJudicial Instructions, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw: AN
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 407, 425-26, 434-38 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds.,
2005) (noting similar problems and suggesting solutions to improve jurors' understanding
of instructions).
187 See infra notes 204-251 and accompanying text.
188 The American Bar Association (ABA) has sought to remedy some of the issues directly related to jury instructions by publishing a book of model instructions. See generally
ABA INTELLECTUAL PROP. LrIG. COMM., MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: COPYRIGHT, TRADE-

MARK AND TRADE DRESS LITIGATION (Todd S. Holbrook & Alan Nathan Harris eds., 2009)
(providing model jury instructions for a variety of intellectual property issues).
189 Lemley, supra note 23, at 740.

190 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992).
191 Id. at 706.
192 See infra notes 253-288 and accompanying text.
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sions permeated by ambiguity. 193 Judge Learned Hand's pronouncement quoted at the beginning of this Article, stating that copyright infringement tests are bound to be vague, 194 continues to reverberate after over fifty years. 195 One notable indication of the fact-specific nature
of substantial similarity inquiries is courts' explicit reluctance to grant
summary judgment in these cases. In copyright infringement cases,
courts have stated that "granting summary judgment, particularly in
favor of the defendant, is a practice to be used sparingly." 196 The main
reason for this is that "substantial similarity is customarily an extremely
close question of fact." 197 One scholar has argued that the concept of
substantial similarity itself has become more, rather than less, ambigu198
ous as it has been subjected to judicial interpretation over the years.
The psychology literature on ambiguous decisions may shed some light
as to the problems that judges and jurors face in copyright cases and
may help to explain the outcomes of related litigation.
Ambiguity has long presented special problems in the context of
cognitive bias and the law. 199 "[0] bserver effects are most potent where
ambiguity is greatest, when an observer's judgment is most likely 2to
00
succumb to expectation, subjective preference, or external utility.

For instance, individuals tend to act with an overabundance of caution
in ambiguous situations, even when they can fairly accurately assess

193Of course, vagueness is a problem in a number of areas of the law, including statutory interpretation. See generally Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON LANGUAGE AND LAw 128 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M.

Solan eds., 2012) (discussing the role of vagueness in the legal system).
194 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
195According to a Westlaw search that I conducted, Judge Hand's pronouncement was
later quoted by twenty other cases. As a related matter, when Judge Jon Newman on the
Second Circuit suggested that an "ordinary observer" test be adopted to determine the
copyrightability of a utilitarian article, Judge Walter Mansfield wrote in a majority opinion
that the proposed test would be so vague as to constitute a "bottomless pit." Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 n.5 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that mannequins of partial human torsos used to showcase clothing were utilitarian articles lacking
artistic or aesthetic attributes that could be physically or conceptually separated from their
utilitarian features and thus were not copyrightable).
96
1 Kohus, 328 F.3d at 853 (quoting Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition, Inc.,
739 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th Cir. 1984)).
197 Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468, 474).
198 Cohen, supra note 23, at 722-23.
199 See infra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
200 D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems ofExpectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 16 (2002).
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risk. 20 1 As a result, juries act in a biased manner and place exaggerated
demands on parties that face uncertainty; indeed, jurors will see the
risks that a defendant took as greater than they were and will view them
as more reckless if the risks were uncertain.0 2 This leads to a conundrum: "[S]ituations of ambiguity, in which precautionary behavior will
be especially difficult because of the ill-defined character of the risks,
should be judged by more lenient liability standards. But, to the contrary, juries will be inclined to be particularly harsh in situations of ambiguity and uncertainty. ' 20 3 The question of substantial similarity can
become confusing for even experienced attorneys and judges; this likely translates into even greater confusion for artists who have to make
decisions as to how to craft their works such as not to infringe. The
empirical research casts concerns as to how judges and juries may adjudicate such situations of artistic uncertainty.
C. Cognitive Bias and CopyrightInfringement
This Section discusses how a number of cognitive biases are likely
to affect judges' and juries' analyses of copyright infringement. 20 4 It fo201

Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 94, at 912-13. Some scholars have distinguished situa-

tions involving ambiguity and those involving risk such that "under ambiguity, the agent is
unable to assign probabilities to states with absolute precision (as would be the case under
risk) but is able to assign 'best-guess' probabilities to such states." Ian M. Dobbs, A Bayesian
Approach to Decision-Making Under Ambiguity, 58 EcONOMICA 417, 417 (1991). As one scholar
explains, "The essence of the distinction between situations involving pure risk and those
involving ambiguity is that in the latter case new information may modify an individual's
estimation of best-guess probabilities, whereas in the former case it will not." Id. That
model shows that the anticipation of finding out an outcome that could produce a feeling
of having previously "mis-evaluated may influence an individual's ex ante assessment of a
given action." Id. at 418. This further illustrates the type of difference in decision-making
strategies that ambiguity can produce.
202 To some extent, this may parallel individuals' and juries' general distaste for particular types of cost-benefit calculations when physical harm is involved. For instance, law
students were unwilling to accept a manufacturer's failure to recall a car model as reasonable even though the cost of the recall would have outweighed the expected costs in consumers' lives; the students' discomfort was rooted in the deontological theory that there is
a limit to the physical harm that individuals should ever have to suffer in exchange for
private profit. Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REv. 249, 255 (1996);
see also Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 495, 505-06
(1986) (noting that jurors were outraged when they learned that the same car manufacturer had performed a cost-benefit analysis in this context).
203 Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 94, at 913. In some situations, such as in a number of
tort-like settings, a party may be able "to reduce the ambiguity of a risk it is creating
through monitoring, research, and experience." Lempert, supra note 100, at 891. This is a
more problematic proposition for the copyright context.
204 See infra notes 206-252 and accompanying text.
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cuses on the biases that are of particular relevance to this legal context,
but the list is not exhaustive-if anything, the issues caused by cognitive
bias in copyright litigation are greater than what this Section indicates.
Part III of this Article then lays out some solutions that will hopefully
205
alleviate the problem of cognitive bias in this area of the law.

1. Hindsight Bias
First, decisionmakers in copyright cases are at an elevated risk of
falling prey to hindsight bias. As one scholar has cogently explained:
As a structural matter, copyright lends itself almost perfectly
to the possibility of hindsight bias. Since the existence and
scope of the entitlement in a work are only ever decided when
the defendant copies parts of it, the presence of actual copying (appropriation) tends to hurt the defendant's case. Indeed, as a historical matter, courts seem to have acknowledged their reliance on hindsight with observations
like "what
' 20 6
is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting."
To some extent, as several scholars have noted, "hindsight bias is indeed an inevitable consequence of any ex post liability and entitlement
delineation process. '2°7 At the same time, other factors, such as the elusive quest for the reasonable man 208 and the emphasis on the two-step
test for copyright infringement, may further exacerbate hindsight bias
in this context. As previously discussed, judges and juries first determine whether copying took place before reaching the question of
See infra notes 253-288 and accompanying text.
Balganesh, Foreseeabilityand Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569,
1631 (2009) (quoting Univ. of London Press, Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press, Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch.
601 at 610 (Eng.)). As Balganesh indicates, although U.S. courts have departed from this
understanding, it remains illustrative of the ex post structural framework that underlies copyright law. Id. at 1631 n.236. A plaintiff and defendant are, on the other hand, likely to overemphasize mentally their unique contributions to their own works. See generally Michael Ross
& Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322 (1979) (demonstrating across several experiments that subject populations as
diverse as naturally occurring discussion groups, married couples, basketball teams, and
groups assembled in a laboratory more easily recalled their own contributions to joint products and accepted more responsibility for a collective product than the rest of the respective
group attributed to them). In the area of patent law, Mark Lemley has criticized the exaggerated role that society assigns to the contributions of "lone genius" inventors and has emphasized the nature of invention as a social rather than individual phenomenon. See Mark A.
Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MIcH. L. REv. 709, 710-11 (2012).
207 Balganesh, supra note 206, at 1631 (citing Rachlinski, supra note 113, at 571).
208 See id.; supra notes 33-144 and accompanying text.
205

206 Shyamkrishna
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whether the copying constituted misappropriation. 20 9 Unlike trademark infringement tests, which balance multiple factors to determine
liability,210 copyright tests consist of a series of binary questions. Although the law no longer officially accepts the idea mentioned above
that something of value must have been taken if copying took place, a
legal decisionmaker may draw conscious or subconscious conclusions
from a determination of copying, which will increase the chance that
he or she will make a finding of substantial similarity.
For one, believing that a defendant copied may also lead to the
implicit assumption that the copied material was not in the public domain (otherwise, it would not have needed to be copied from the
plaintiff). Relatedly, if the assumption prevails that what was taken was
somehow unique to the plaintiff's work, any use of that material is likely
to elicit impressions of free riding. Indeed, Lemley has shown that the
use of free riding rhetoric has dramatically increased in intellectual
property decisions over time, 2 1 1 and he criticizes the "assumption on
the part of courts that all enrichment derived from use of an intellectual property right is necessarily unjust. ,212 Olufunmilayo Arewa echoes
this sentiment by noting a general misunderstanding of the concept of
free riding in the copyright context and emphasizing that some degree
of free riding in the form of borrowing is inevitable in musical expression.213 Problematic understandings of free riding that do not conform
to the spirit of copyright law may be overcome in litigation, but we must
take them seriously nonetheless because they can tip the balance in
some cases if left unmonitored. On average, if the analysis in this Article proves correct, it appears that hindsight bias will result in proplaintiff effects.
Relatedly, hindsight bias may be exacerbated by a version of the socalled "reverse halo effect," which refers to the issue that "once observers (including jurors) hear of an isolated act of misconduct, they trans209 See supra notes 151-192 and accompanying text.
210 See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)
(delineating what has become the best-known trademark infringement test).
211 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1031,
1039 (2005) (showing that variations of the term "free riding" were used in over 50% of all
cases between 1983 and 2003, as compared to figures below 25% between 1943 and 1973).
212
Id. at 1044.
213Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess,
and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERs L.J. 277, 341 (2006). This also dovetails with Jeanne Fromer's
description of the creative process and the fact that people want to see and hear works that
are new but not overly so. Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 Nw. U.
L. Rxv. 1441, 1479-83 (2010).
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mute that act into a generally bad character, which deflects the jurors
from fairly assessing the evidence." 214 Just as legal decisionmakers may
infer that what was taken was worth taking, they may conclude that the
type of person who is willing to copy from others is also the type who is
willing to do so in a way that is unlawful. Some of this is rooted in what
Arewa considers a misunderstanding of the creative process, as mentioned above. 215 Further, as Ann Bartow has indicated, "[a]ccusations
related to acts of copying carry a surfeit of negative connotations. If one
copies answers from the exam of the student sitting in the next chair,
one is a cheater; if one copies the words of others into one's essay without appropriate attribution, one is a plagiarist." 216 She also states that
people believe "that the very act of copying exudes an aura of actionable
evil." 217 Although most scholars would draw numerous distinctions between the act of copyright infringement and that of plagiarism, 218 not all
would. 219 Additionally, the lay jury is more likely to lump some of these
actions together, especially if directly encouraged to do so by plaintiffs'
attorneys. Bartow's recommendation that legal decisionmakers "repress
any visceral negative emotional reactions that acts of copying provoke in
them"220 is thus unlikely to overcome the reverse halo effect given that
the bias largely operates at the subconscious level.
2. Anchoring
Another bias that likely enters the equation in copyright-related
decision making is a type of anchoring. Anchoring generally "refers to
the tendency for arbitrary set points to influence judgment."221 In the
case of copyrighted materials, jurors or judges are asked to compare an
allegedly infringing piece to the original, which may turn the original
214 David A. Sonenshein, Circuit Roulette: The Use of Prior Convictions to Impeach Credibility
in Civil Cases Under the FederalRules of Evidence, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 279, 297 (1988) (citation omitted).
215 See Arewa, supra note 213, at 341.
216 Bartow, supra note 23, at 84 (citation omitted).
217 Id. at 93.
218 See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism,Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
167, 202 (2002); Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Tangled Web of PlagiarismLitigation: Sorting Out the
Legal Issues, 2009 B.Y.U. EDuc. & L.J. 245, 261.
219 See, e.g., Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Frameworkfor Copyright Philosophy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1278, 1290 (2003) (designating plagiarism and copyright piracy as "conceptual cousin [s] ").
220 Bartow, supra note 23, at 102.
221 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and

CautiousSupporters, 85

CORNELL

L. REV. 739, 751 n.60 (2000).
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into an anchor. At least at the margins, decisionmakers are likely to
overfocus on similarities to the original and gravitate toward a finding
of liability, which again favors plaintiffs.

222

Under the current test, and

due to the way that materials are presented to decisionmakers, as long
as the two pieces bear some degree of similarity (which they usually do
to make it to this stage of litigation) they may be perceived as more
strikingly similar as a result of anchoring than they ever would have if
they had been encountered by observers outside the courtroom. This
effect may be even stronger where the original work is displayed first in
court, which is likely to take place the vast majority of the time.
3. Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias may also play a relevant role in the copyright
infringement context, either in conjunction with anchoring or on its
own. Confirmation bias has been defined as "the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations,
or a hypothesis in hand. 223 This bias has been observed in a number of
legal contexts, including fingerprinting identification. 224 In one study,
most of the experts used as study subjects misidentified a set of fingerprints as a nonmatch after being given erroneous contextual information even though they were asked to regard that information as irrelevant. 22 5 In copyright cases, legal decisionmakers tasked with examining
the existence of substantial similarity may draw conclusions based on
some similar traits between the original and allegedly infringing works
and then interpret other traits as more similar than they would have
but for these initial conclusions. The fact that the plaintiff presents his
case first may exacerbate the pro-plaintiff effect that this bias potentially
already has in copyright litigation. The so-called "irrational primacy
effect" has been observed in other contexts in which subjects develop a
working hypothesis based on initial information that influences how

222 Anchoring may also play a role in the determination of damages once there is a
finding of liability.
223 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2
REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998).
224 Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications,156 FoRENSIC Sci. INT'L 74, 76 (2006).
225 Id
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they view subsequent pieces of evidence; 226 this effect may play a role
here as well.2 27
4. The Overconfidence Effect
One phenomenon has the potential to worsen all the biases described above: the overconfidence effect. It causes individuals to exhibit
greater confidence in their decision-making abilities than their actual
accuracy warrants.2 "28 We know that "[c] ognitive psychological research
indicates that one of the best mechanisms for reducing overconfident
judgments is forcing oneself to consider alternatives and carefully review arguments against one's position." 229 Though, as in all litigation,
judges and jurors in copyright cases hear arguments from both sides,
this issue remains particularly challenging in contexts in which decisionmakers encounter the key evidence in a direct manner. As mentioned in the Introduction, 23 in the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court case Scott
v. Harris,the justices showed such great confidence in their judgment
because the relevant car chase was captured on video and they could
see the evidence with their own eyes. When that is the case, individuals
are likely to be less open-minded about counter-arguments, as one can
surmise from some of the justices' belief that anyone who watched the
tape would draw the same conclusion as they did. 23' As we know from

proved excessive, and indiDan Kahan's work, the justices' confidence
2 2
3
disagree.
did
groups
specific
from
viduals

226 Nickerson, supra note 223, at 187.

227 The relationship between primacy and recency effects is complex, and the respective strengths of each are the subject of some debate; it is noteworthy, however, that in
many jurisdictions, plaintiffs enjoy the benefits of both because they not only speak first
when trials begin, but they also proceed first and last during the closing arguments phase.
SeeJohn B. Mitchell, Why Should the ProsecutorGet the Last Word?, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 139, 157
n.42 (2000) (citing Michael F. Colby, Ffiendly Persuasion: Gaining Attention, Comprehension,
and Acceptance in Court, 17 TRIAL 42, 46 (1981)); see also E. Allan Lind, The Psychology of
Courtroom Procedure,in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM, supra note 75, at 13, 24-27
(discussing the issue of the order of presentation of evidence).
228 See, e.g., Gerry Pallier et al., The Role of Individual Differences in the Accuracy of ConfidenceJudgments, 129J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 257, 258-59 (2002).
229

JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 588 (2002); see also DerekJ. Koehler, Hypothesis Generation
and Confidence in Judgment, 20J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNI-

TION 461, 466 (1994) (showing that subjects asked to generate hypotheses about an event
were more likely to question a prespecified hypothesis).
230 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
231 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 n.5 (2007).
232 See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (describing Kahan's research).
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The overconfidence effect-which is "[o]ne of the mcot robust
findings in the literature of individual decision making" 2 33-has been
shown across a variety of settings, and groups can exacerbate this type
of bias. 234 Overconfidence is particularly great when accurate judgments are hard to make. 235 This raises concerns in the copyright context where, as discussed, much decision making takes place in the face
of ambiguity.23 6 Overconfidence can serve as a compounding element

for other cognitive biases and "magnifies the undesirable consequences
of erroneous judgment." 237 Some research also shows that self-serving
biases like overconfidence are actually exacerbated in decisionmakers
who have some level of expertise.2 38 Indeed, this bias has been observed
in doctors, psychologists, lawyers, negotiators, engineers, and security
2 39

analysts.

Judges appear to fall prey to the overconfidence effect in a number of settings. When asked where they would place themselves in a
ranking of judges across three dimensions (ability to assess the credibility of a witness, ability to avoid bias, and ability to facilitate settlement),
over 83% of administrative law judges placed themselves in the top half,
and none placed themselves in the bottom quartile. 240 Similarly, in a
study of magistrate judges which asked how high the judges' appeal
rate was, over 87% of subjects believed that their peers had higher re233 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND EcoNOMICS 144, 149 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
234 Id. at 150 (citing Chip Heath & ForestJ. Jourden, Illusions, Disillusionsand the BufferingEffects of Groups, 69 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Hu i. DECISION PROCESSES 103, 104-06
(1997)). Overconfidence, like other cognitive biases, can be adaptive in some situations,
which is likely why the effect persists despite its drawbacks. See Heath & Jourden, supra, at
114.
235 SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OFJUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 219 (1993).
236 See supra notes 193-203 and accompanying text.
237 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism,97 Nw. U. L.

REV. 1165, 1173 (2003).
238 Id. at 1172-73.
239 Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing ofEvidence and the Determinantsof Confidence,
24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 414 (1992) (explaining that overconfidence is established by
the balance of arguments for and against the competing hypothesis without sufficient attention to the weight of the evidence). Two critics have quipped that the decision making of
experts is "often wrong but rarely in doubt." Id.; see Nathanael Fast et al., Power and Overconfident Decision-Making, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES (forthcoming
2012), available at http://www-bcf.usc.edu/-nathanaf/power-and-overconfident-decision_
making.pdf (discussing a set of studies on the relationship between subjects' perception of
their own power and their level of overconfidence).
240 Chris Guthrie et al., The "HiddenJudiciary": An Empirical Examination of Executive
BranchJustice,58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1519 (2009).

2012]

Reasonable Copyright

1345

versal rates than themselves. 241 This overconfidence likely permeates a
wide variety of decision-making processes, and at least one scholar, Jeffrey Rachlinski, has expressed concern that the new pleading standards
set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2009 in Ashcroft v. Iqbal will require judges to exhibit a level of humility "that likely exists in no professional decision maker."242 In particular, judges will have to evaluate at
that early stage the degree of confidence that they possess in their own
thoughts about how the case should continue; in light of the existing
research, Rachlinski concludes that this will likely result in overconfidence. 243 The same effect extends to judges' views of their own abilities
to minimize racial bias, with 97% of judges rating their ability to avoid
244
racially motivated decision making as better than that of their peers'.
Based on the weight of the evidence in these contexts, it is not a stretch
to suspect strongly that judges view themselves as good or at least decent decisionmakers in the copyright context and that their ability to
for secondview directly the most relevant evidence leaves little room
245
judgments.
definitive
making
for
level
skill
guessing their
5. The Role of Other Attributes
In addition to the problems of cognitive bias that may be described
as "heuristics gone wrong," there are indications that cognitive processing of the subject matters covered by copyright law can take place differently on a number of characteristic axes, such as gender.246 Scholars
have long written about gender differences in the perception of art objects. 247 A brain imaging study showed differences between men and
women in the cerebral processing of beautiful images such as paint-

et al., supranote 120, at 813-14.
JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, ProcessingPleadings and the Psychology of Prejudgment, 60 DEPAUL
L. REv. 413, 427 (2011); see Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 107, 140-44 (2010) (calling for judicial humility); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (articulating new pleading standards).
243 Rachlinski, supra note 242, at 427-28.
44
2 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1195, 1225 (2009).
245 See PLous, supra note 235, at 227-30 (offering general suggestions on how to reduce the overconfidence bias).
246 See infra notes 247-251 and accompanying text.
247 See, e.g., F. Graeme Chalmers, Women as Art Viewers: Sex Differences and Aesthetic Prefer241 Guthrie
242

ence, 18 STUD. ART EDUC. 49, 49 (1977). For example, a study of children showed that girls
prefer pictures of women and children whereas boys have a strong preference for pictures
of men. Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
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ings. 248 The researchers suggested that this may correspond to different
249
strategies that men and women use to make aesthetic judgments.
Gender differences also, for instance, extend to perceptions of and aesthetic preferences for specific colors. 250 In listening studies, both gender
and level of musical expertise influenced patterns of brain activation.25 1
Although copyright trials involve many more elements than will fit
into a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machine, the cognitive processes and differences observed in prior studies are likely to play a role
in legal decision making. Hence, the effects of particular attributes of
judges or juries, combined with (1) copyright's emphasis on the decisionmaker's direct perception of the allegedly illegal subject matter,
and (2) the bias-increasing ambiguity of the subject matter, may create
a dangerously unreliable black box, the ill effects of which are undone
only with great difficulty in any given trial. Although none of the problems articulated in this Section lend themselves to simple fixes, the next
Part describes some ways that may improve decision making in the
252
copyright context.
III.

COPYRIGHT FOR THE BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL MAN:
PAVING THE WAY FOR A SOLUTION

This Part critiques some of the changes that have been suggested
to improve the copyright infringement test-such as giving a greater
role to judges over juries or increasing the use of experts-and proposes a new model.2 5-3 It discusses the possibility of implementing direct
debiasing mechanisms but focuses especially on openly embracing the
subjective nature of decision making in the copyright infringement
context. 254 I argue for the adoption of social science tools that are
modeled on those in the trademark area, which would honor this inherent subjectivity, help to draw the proper distinction between ideas
248 Camilo J. Cela-Conde et al., Sex-Related Similarities and Differences in the Neural Correlates of Beauty, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 3847, 3851 (2009).
249

Id.

See, e.g., Anya C. Hurlbert & Yazhu Ling, Biological Components of Sex Differences in
Color Preference, 17 CURRENT BIOLOGY R623, R624 (2007); see also Natalia Khouw, The Meaning of Color for Gender, http://www.colormatters.com/color-symbolism/gender-differences
(last visited Aug. 13, 2012) (reviewing some of the empirical research on gender-related
perceptions of color).
251 Stefan Evers et al., The Cerebral Haemodynamics of Music Perception: A Transcranial
Doppler Sonography Study, 122 BRAIN 75, 80-83 (1999).
252 See infra notes 253-288 and accompanying text.
253 See infra notes 255-288 and accompanying text.
254 See infra notes 255-266 and accompanying text.
250
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and expressions, and indirectly but critically minimize the biases discussed in this Article.
Mark Lemley has proposed leaving the wrongful copying step to
judges rather than jurors, using expert testimony for that step, and potentially adopting an "abstraction-filtration-dissection" approach similar
to the one used in the software context. 255 As this Article has shown,
however, judges are not necessarily better decisionmakers than juries,
especially with regard to some of the cognitive biases relevant to copyright considerations.25 Furthermore, it is unclear what effect experts
themselves would have. If each side marshals opposing experts, decisionmakers may go back to trusting their own eyes and ears because
they have direct access to the key evidence. As to dissecting works of a
literary or musical nature, Lemley's concerns about juries' inability to
distinguish between protectable and unprotectable elements are welltaken, 257 but a dilemma arises in adopting his proposal because, at the
end of the day, the intended audience of the works will be confronted
with and will be comparing the works as wholes. I hold the view that the
intended audience should be our main focus in this context given that
the potential harm that infringement causes to copyright owners, both
financial and non-financial, results from the perceptions of those
members of the public who will encounter the works rather than from
the views of society at large. 25 8 As an additional matter, Shyam Balganesh has argued recently that the substantial similarity analysis invites
important normative-rather than only utilitarian-values to receive
consideration when courts allow for "subjective evaluation of wrongdoing. 259 Later in this Part, this Article proposes changes to the copyright

255 See Lemley, supra note 23, at 741. Jamie Lund has also called for the increased use
of experts in the music composition copyright area. Lund, supra note 25, at 174.
256 In addition, there are compelling reasons for preserving a role for American juries.
For instance, serving on a jury can better enable citizens to participate in democratic government, and possible reductions in the role of the jury deserve a critical eye from that
perspective. See Jason Mazzone, The Justice and the Jury, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 35, 37-38 (2006)
(analyzing Justice Harry Blackmun's views on the jury system).
257 See Lemley, supra note 23, at 739.
25s To some extent, this also parallels what we ask patent juries to do when they have to

determine the views of the "person having ordinary skill in the art" ("PHOSITA"). See 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
2-9 Balganesh, supra note 15, at 24. As Balganesh acknowledges, "None of this is to
suggest of course, that courts have developed a unified, coherent framework for the
wrongful copying analysis." Id.
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infringement doctrine that take into account26some of Lemley's points
and attempt to mediate these other concerns. 0
A second possibility worth considering is increasing the use of direct debiasing tools by judges and attorneys via admonishments or particular written instructions to the jury. Though the idea of debiasing
has been studied a number of times in the psychology literature, "empirical findings about these forms of debiasing have made only limited
appearances in the legal literature." 261 One of the great frustrations for
researchers in the area of debiasing is that many biases tend to be so
powerfully entrenched that experiments have often failed to produce
significant improvements.2 62 There are, however, some exceptions to
260 See infra notes 267-288 and accompanying text. There have been some other interesting proposals in the context of solving the legal puzzles surrounding copyright infringement. Jeanne Fromer has explored the idea of using written claims to describe the
key elements of copyrighted works but ultimately considered that model problematic as
well. Fromer, supra note 23, at 781-94. Rebecca Tushnet has proposed a complete rejection of the substantial similarity analysis in favor of a modified version of the standard used
to determine the legitimacy of derivative works. Tushnet, supra note 23, at 738-40. In that
framework, "a reproduction right would cover only pure copying and copying so nearly
exact that observers would be inclined to see two works as the same." Id. at 739.
Although Tushnet describes her model fairly briefly, I will delineate a few preliminary
responses. She states that she is leaving out "problems of implementation," including "how
much reprographic copying would be enough to constitute infringement of the reproduction right." Id. at 740 n.258. First, I would be interested to see a model in action that
achieves these distinctions without running into the same problems as those we see in the
substantial similarity analysis. Second, her model is, by her own admission, "radical," and
"does anticipate a contraction in the scope of rights conferred by a copyright over subsequent works." Id. at 738, 740 n.258. There is nothing inherently wrong with either of these
facts, but they will require a reconceptualization of copyright law of a different sort than
that proposed in this Article. The goal of my argument is to address an issue that will exist
no matter where we draw the boundaries of copyright protection: what makes two works
too similar to each other. This problem persists whether we allow minimal, moderate, or
generous copying, and whether we analyze it as part of the reproduction right or derivative
right. I agree with Tushnet on the tension between analytic dissection and gestalt evaluation in the substantial similarity analysis, but I hope that my proposal in this Part helps us
tease apart protectable from unprotectable elements in creative works, which is one of
Tushnet's main concerns. See id. at 740.
261 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
201 (2006); see Martin F. Kaplan & Lynn E. Miller, Reducing the Effects ofJuror Bias, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1443, 1449-50 (1978) (presenting debiasing methods that
increase the salience of information relevant in decision making).
262 See, e.g., Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 104, 99-100 (failing to reduce hindsight bias). See generallyBaruch Fischhoff, Debiasing,inJUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 422 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (finding that three debiasing techniques yielded limited success and a fourth, involving intensive personalized feedback and
training, yielded only moderate, short-term improvements). Some scholars have noted that
for debiasing to take place, an individual must be aware of the unwanted processing, motivated to correct the bias, conscious of the direction and magnitude of the bias, and able to
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263
this trend, such as a partial reduction of hindsight bias in one study.
In that experiment, a defense attorney's closing argument admonished
mock jurors in a torts case not to use hindsight, to consider the time
before the negative outcome occurred, and not to let the plaintiff rope
them into playing "Monday-morning quarterback." 264 The possibilities
for direct debiasing in the copyright context are worth exploring further, though the empirical research so far reveals many obstacles despite the fact that the studies tended to focus on one bias at a time and
several would potentially need to be addressed for copyright infringe2 65

ment.

One fairly dramatic proposal that some scholars have made in other areas to reduce biases is trial bifurcation. 266 For copyright cases, this
would mean having two different juries (and/or judges) for the two
parts of the test. The decisionmakers for the second prong, however,
would likely know or could guess that the first prong was met or they
would have never been convened, which could reinsert the same biases
one would have had with a unified trial. Another possibility would be to
alternate which prong gets decided first, so that the decisionmakers
deciding the second prong would not necessarily know that the first
prong had been met. Even so, there remain several problems with this
adjust her response. E.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 119
(1994). "Since only the first condition can be guaranteed in many situations, including juror
judgments, it is difficult to imagine a generally effective debiasing method." Reid Hastie et
al., Looking Backward in PunitiveJudgments: 20-20 Vision?, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 96, 108 (2002). Some judges have individually begun
efforts to debias juries by informing them of the issue of implicit biases, but the success or
failure of these attempts has not been empirically confirmed at this stage. SeeJerry Kang et
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REv. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 55-58)
al.,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2026540).
263 Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Reducing the Hindsight Bias UtilizingAttorney ClosingArguments, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 671, 679-80 (1998).
264Id. at 675. Some scholars have also suggested ways to reduce confirmation bias, including by presenting the debiasing information in a graphical layout. See Maia B. Cook &
Harvey S. Smallman, Human Factors of the Confirmation Bias in Intelligence Analysis: Decision
Support from GraphicalEvidence Landscapes, 50 HUM. FACTORS: J. HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS Soc'y 745, 751-52 (2008).
265 See Fischoff, supra note 262, at 440-41.
LaBine & LaBine, supra note 111, at 514 (suggesting bifurcation in deter266See, e.g.,
minations of liability for mental health providers); Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious
II: ExperimentalStudy on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE
J.L. & TCH. 1, 35-37 (2007) (discussing bifurcation in the patent area); John E. Montgomery, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in Tort Litigation:A Proposalto Limit Their Effects Without Changing the World, 85 NEB. L. REv. 15, 31-32 (2006) (proposing bifurcation for torts
cases).
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idea. One of the most significant is the financial and logistical cost associated with empanelling two juries, thereby duplicating attorney time
spent explaining certain issues and increasing other trial costs. Another
is the risk that plaintiffs' attorneys will, intentionally or not, transmit
cues to the decisionmakers of the second prong as to the first prong
having been decided in their favor. Lastly, although the bifurcated approach could help with issues like the reverse halo effect and hindsight
bias, the many other problems that exist during the evaluation of the
second prong on its own-such as confirmation bias, cultural biases,
general difficulties with the reasonable man standard, and other obstacles-would remain.
Here, I propose a different kind of solution to address the multilayered complications that the current test engenders. The first step is
to accept that despite the general designation of the reasonable man
standard as an objective test, copyright infringement litigation actually
seeks to determine subjective responses to the materials. If that is the
case, then the question is whose response matters. As alluded to above,
this Article takes the position that the relevant determination with regards to harm to the plaintiff is the response of the intended audience. 267 The courts have not always taken a consistent approach to the
relevant universe, but some cases emphasize the importance of this
concept. For instance, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded a
case for determination of whether the spiritual music in question was
268
mainly purchased by choral directors with specialized expertise. Although the court emphasized that "'intended audience' should supplant 'ordinary observer' as the label for the appropriate test,"269 it did
so with the view that its holding was consistent with the Second Circuit
2 70 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals' test in Arnstein v. Porter.
explained:
Consistent with its economic incentive view of copyright law,
the Arnstein court concluded that "the question, therefore, is
whether defendant took from plaintiffs works so much of
267 Balganesh remarks that the intended audience test carries some risks, particularly
in situations in which "[t]he value of a work to the copyright-holder might, for instance, be
diminished by the creation of complementary, rather than substitutive copies." Balganesh,
supra note 15, at 14-15. He adds, however, that it is not necessarily the case that when focusing on the intended audience "instead of the default ordinary observer one actually
alters the underlying content of the inquiry in any significant manner." Id. at 15.
268 Dawson v.Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990).
269 Id.
270 See

id. at 734.
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what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that defendant
wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to plaintiff.",2 1

Lemley agrees with this understanding of Arnstein and argues that the
Arnstein court's use of the term "lay listeners" may have caused some of
the subsequent confusion. 272 At this time, the Fourth Circuit is the only
Circuit to have adopted definitively an intended audience test across
copyright subject matters.2 73
Robert and Eric Osterberg comment in their treatise that "to apply
the intended audience test, a court must both identify the intended
audience, and either select only members of that audience for its jury
or accept expert testimony concerning the intended audience's reaction." 274 My proposal, which goes a step further and dovetails with the
inherent subjectivity of substantial similarity determinations, is to introduce survey evidence about the intended audience into copyright
infringement litigation. This parallels the use of surveys in trademark
infringement litigation 275 but has not yet been the norm, or even per276
mitted, for copyright cases.
Courts have spent little time discussing why copyright surveys
would be problematic, and their arguments so far do not appear particularly convincing. For instance, the Second Circuit explained that
survey questions would run the risk of being either too open-ended
271 Id. (quoting Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946)). The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its focus on the intended audience in a case involving dinosaur costumes
marketed to children, in which it stated that the court needs to consider the perspective of
children accordingly. Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 802-03 (4th
Cir. 2001).
272 Lemley, supra note 23, at 729. The Ninth Circuit has faced this issue as well, based
on its reading of Krofft the court reiterated in a later case that "the test of substantial similarity depends upon the response of the ordinary lay listener." Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812
F.2d 421, 424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp. 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
273 See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 159, § 3:2.2[D].
2
74 Id. § 3:2.2[E].
275 See, e.g., Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Modelfor the Content and Procedural

Treatment of Trademark In/ringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1027, 1036-41
(2007) (offering a description of the use of such surveys). Scholars have emphasized the
need for surveys in the trademark context precisely for the reason that, otherwise, a judge
or jury will be asked to perform an impossible "Vulcan mind meld" with the consumers of
a good when instructed to determine their thoughts and impressions. William E. Gallagher & Ronald C. Goodstein, Inference Versus Speculation in Trademark Infringement Litigation:
9
Abandoning theFiction of the Vulcan Mind Meld, 4 TRADEMARK REP. 1229, 1232-36 (2004).
276 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 159, § 17:3 (citations omitted).
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and general or too specific (citing as an improper example, "Do you
think [one] is substantially similar to [the other]?"). 277 Another, related
concern is the difficulty of explaining substantial similarity to study subjects.27 This assumes, however, that copyright survey subjects would be
confronted with direct legal questions, which is not how admissible
trademark surveys function. 279 Rather, subjects in the latter setting generally have to answer open-ended questions such as "Who do you think
made this product?" 280 These surveys take place in a number of environments, including at malls or on the Internet. 28 1 The measure of
trademark confusion is the differential between the percentage of subjects who, for example, name the plaintiff as the manufacturer of the
allegedly infringing product, versus those who name the plaintiff as the
manufacturer of a control product. 282 Although further study and experiments are needed before comparable surveys could be implemented in the substantial similarity setting, 283 there may be ways to
adapt the trademark experience to the needs of copyright.
Of interest in this context, one of the scale measures that Jamie
Lund used in her empirical research on music composition copyrights
was one of so-called ordinal similarity, where subjects were asked to rate
pieces on a scale of one to five (with one standing for "not at all similar"
and five for "very similar").284 One could use this type of measure to
assess the degree of similarity that the relevant audience perceives between two works. My main answer to the courts concerned about the
vagaries of copyright surveys, however, is that we are effectively already
277 Warner
278

Bros., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 244, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1983).
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 159, § 17:3 (citing Aaron Basha Corp. v. Felix
B. Vollman, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y 2000)).
279 See Manta, supra note 275, at 1036-37.
280 See id. at 1068-69.
281 See id. at 1070.
282 See id. at 1068 (discussing control stimuli in trademark surveys). The percentage differential that courts consider to be evidence of infringement varies, but it has generally been
above 20%, with some exceptions of 15% and below. See 4J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:188 (4th ed. 2012).
283 Some of the questions that one would need to answer are how to select the proper
subjects (how to define the so-called "survey universe"), how to present the works to subjects, what conditions the control stimuli need to fulfill, what exact questions to ask, and

what threshold to set as the required level of perceived similarity. Allowing for significant
amounts ofjudicial discretion on these matters risks reintroducing some of the biases that
surveys seek to eliminate, so a broadly applicable floor for what is considered appropriate
evidence could prove helpful. See Manta, supra note 275, at 1066-71 (proposing general
standards for trademark surveys). I would like to thank Jake Linford for our conversation
on this subject.
284 Lund, supra note 25, at 155.
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conducting surveys, but of the most unscientific kind--ones with a
sample size of twelve (jury) or one (judge). Even if we adopt the intended audience test, and even if we include experts, it will be very difficult for juries or judges to separate their own direct perceptions of the
materials without the help of surveys. Just as Dan Kahan's research findings on the Scott v. Harris video probably gave pause to the Supreme
Court justices who initially trusted their "own eyes" above all and did
not realize how many others might disagree with them, jurors and
judges are likely to respond to evidence about what large groups of relevant individuals believe. 285 If presented with the perceptions of numerous members of the intended audience,jurors and judges are more
likely to reach the optimal result than if they are told that their own
perceptions are the relevant ones or that they need to deduce what an
2 86
abstract, average, reasonable observer would perceive.
Given that study subjects would not know about the context of the
litigation, surveys would achieve what the bifurcation proposals attempt
to do-they would reduce hindsight bias and the reverse halo effect.
Surveys would further provide valuable information through the inclusion of a control stimulus, as can be seen in trademark surveys and in
Lund's study through her use of comparison materials. 287 This would
require plaintiffs to delineate the scope of the protection they are
285 We know from different settings that individuals at times adjust their beliefs based
on others' beliefs. See generallyJan Lorenz et al., How Social Influence Can Undermine the Wisdom of Crowd Effect, PROCEEDINGS NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. (forthcoming), available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/05/10/1008636108.abstract (describing both
the positive and negative repercussions of this effect). Of course, the risk remains that
jurors or judges would still give too much credence to their own eyes and ears, which suggests the possibility that the decisionmakers themselves should not be confronted with the
direct evidence at all. SeeAlbert E. Mannes, Are We Wise About the Wisdom of Crowds?, The Use
of GroupJudgments in Belief Revision, 55 MGMT. ScI. 1267, 1277 (2009) (suggesting that individuals still tend to overweigh their initial beliefs and underweigh the more valid judgment of groups). This more radical version of my proposal remains open to examination
and certainly has a number of drawbacks. But see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Improving the Quality ofJury Decisionmaking, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 64, at
341, 365-68 (advocating for greateruse of visual and videotape evidence in trials).
286 There will certainly be exceptions to this trend. In a series of interviews with Dutch
judges involved in intellectual property cases, one judge said about survey data: "If it corroborates with our own perception, then we are grateful and use it. If we want to go the
other way, then it is just a nuisance, because then we have to argue it away." DirkJ.G. Visser, How DoJudges Decide Intellectual Property Cases? [Introduction], 31st Annual Cong.
of the Int'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Teaching & Research in Intellectual Prop.
(ATRIP), 3, http://www.atrip2012.com/docs/VisserJudgesDecideIPCases.pdf (last visited
Aug. 22, 2012). This "arguing away," however, would likely still yield more information
during the appellate process than currently exists in the absence of surveys.
287 Lund, supra note 25, at 158.
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claiming because the amount of infringement would be determined by
the differential between (1) the level of similarity between the original
work and the allegedly infringing work, and (2) the level of similarity
between the original work and that used as a control stimulus. 288 It
would facilitate the legal decisionmakers' task of determining whether
plaintiffs are respecting the idea-expression dichotomy because, as with
trademarks, a proper survey would have to use a control stimulus that
uses the same ideas but a different expression. Hence, this would give courts
better information as to whether it is the protectable or the unprotectable elements of a work that are leading to perceptions of similarity on
the part of the intended audience. The inclusion of a control stimulus
would also allow for anchoring effects to wash out because both the
allegedly infringing and the control work would be compared to the
original, so the original would serve as the potential anchor for both,
and that effect would be deducted during the calculation of the final
"similarity differential." The same is likely true for the confirmation
bias; both comparisons would suffer from that bias to some extent, and
its eventual effect would either partially or entirely disappear during
that same calculation.
Defendants would have the opportunity to present their own surveys as well. The costs of copyright litigation would change, but it is unclear whether they would increase. Plaintiffs may indeed be more reluctant to bring a copyright claim if they feel the need to commission a
survey, but to the extent that we worry about deterrence of rightful
plaintiffs, we could adjust damages calculations accordingly if liability is
found. The burden on defendants could increase if they have to conduct surveys to counter plaintiffs' surveys, though we may be able to
shift this by awarding greater costs to defendants if they are successful
in litigation. It is entirely possible that this will reduce the overall
amount of copyright litigation, thus lowering the burden on courts and
hence ultimately on society at large. Many would welcome this development, especially if-along with the improvement of copyright doctrine that it would provide-it ended up encouraging greater creativity
due to partial relief from the fear of litigation.
CONCLUSION

The ideas delineated in this Article are a beginning rather than a
final conclusion. More empirical work would prove beneficial both for
288See generally Fromer, supranote 23 (offering a more extensive discussion of claiming
issues in copyright and patent law).
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measuring the precise extent of some of the problems described here
and for developing solutions tailored to the specific issues of copyright
litigation. 289 This Article has attempted to show the complex relationship between copyright law's version of the reasonable man standard,
cognitive and cultural bias, and ambiguity. It has demonstrated why and
how we should reconcile with the subjective nature of the substantial
similarity analysis, and it has sketched out possible paths guided by insights from social science. The future remains open, and we will hopefully one day develop better tools to measure directly the intended audience's perceptions of similarity, be it through listening studies or
perhaps even brain imaging technology when its cost is significantly
reduced and its precision enhanced. 290 The road will be made of incremental steps, but the goal is clear: a more objective approach to
human subjectivity.

289 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive
Science, 86 TEX. L. REv. 507 (2008) (discussing the dangers of using social science tools
with insufficient empirical backing in the context of intellectual property infringement,
and specifically trademark dilution).
290 See generally Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585
(2011) (discussing the potential of new technologies to assess subjective experiences).

